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C. Russell Brown

James Mavor

THE
RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

PART I.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

PREFACE	PAGE
		5
CHAPTER I.		
INTRODUCTION	7
CHAPTER II.		
THE WAR STRENGTH OF JAPAN	18
CHAPTER III.		
THE WAR STRENGTH OF RUSSIA	26
CHAPTER IV.		
THE THEATRE OF WAR AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION	37
CHAPTER V.		
THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES	41
CHAPTER VI.		
THE BATTLE OF THE YA-LU	52
APPENDIX A.		
STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN TROOPS IN THE FAR EAST AT THE BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY, 1904	1A
APPENDIX B.		
COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FORCES AT THE END OF APRIL, 1904	5A
APPENDIX C.		
ORDER OF BATTLE AND LOSSES OF THE FIRST JAPANESE ARMY AND OF THE RUSSIAN EASTERN FORCE AT THE BATTLE OF THE YA-LU	8A

MAPS.



- I.—General map of the theatre of war.
- II.—Sketch map of the north-west corner of Korea.
- III.—Battle of the Ya-lu (30th April).
- IV.—Battle of the Ya-lu (1st May).
- V.—Action near Ha-ma-tang.

A general map of Manchuria will be issued with Part II.

PREFACE.

As a considerable time must necessarily elapse before either of the combatants in the late campaign in Manchuria produces an official history of the operations, it has been thought advisable to prepare a narrative of which the present publication is the First Part.

This work, which has been compiled by the General Staff, lays no claim to be complete and accurate in every respect, but all available information, with the exception of such matter as it has been considered necessary to withhold, has been utilized.

Criticism has been excluded, as it is necessarily of doubtful value when based upon imperfect knowledge, and naval operations have only been touched upon in so far as they affect movements on land.

The Part, now published, deals with the causes of the war, and the opening events up to and including the battle of the Ya-lu. Other parts to complete the work will be issued from time to time.

GENERAL STAFF,

WAR OFFICE.

August, 1906.

NOTE.

The additional information given below was received too late for insertion in the text.

- Page 48. The footnote should read :—The flank guard, which was under the command of Major-General Sasaki, marched to Chyangsyong on the Ya-lu.
- „ 57. Line 26, *for* “a battalion” *read* “two battalions.”
- „ 62. The second footnote should be expunged.
- „ 63. Last line, *for* “Siojo” *read* “Chyangsyong.”
- „ 63. The third footnote should read :—This detachment (see p. 47) had originally covered the right flank of the First Army in the advance from Anju, and had marched to Chyangsyong on the Ya-lu. When it was ordered, prior to the battle, to rejoin the 12th Division, one squadron, one battalion (believed to have been the 1st Battalion 14th Regiment) and one battery were left at Chyangsyong.
- „ 75. On the 17th April, General Kuroki received the following instructions from Imperial Head-Quarters :—
“The Second Army will begin landing at the mouth of the Ta-sha Ho on the 1st May, and its disembarkation will take about forty-five days to complete. The First Army will therefore advance as far as Tang-shan-cheng [midway between An-tung and Feng-huang-cheng], and having entrenched itself will wait there till the Second Army has finished its disembarkation. The two armies will then co-operate.”
In consequence of these instructions and the difficult nature of the ground, General Kuroki decided not to pursue the Russians after their defeat on the Ya-lu.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

ON the 14th November, 1860, six days after the withdrawal of the allied forces of Great Britain and France from Peking, a treaty of the highest importance was concluded between Russia and China, whereby the eastern coast of Manchuria from the Amur to the Korean frontier, a district which subsequently became known as the *Primorsk* or Maritime Province, was ceded to the Tsar. Nearly three centuries earlier, the Cossack Yermak, acting under Imperial auspices, had led his motley band of freebooters eastward across the Urals to subjugate Siberia, and his successors in expansive effort now found themselves established on the far-distant shores of the Sea of Japan.

The advance to the dreary confines of the Asiatic continent, though at times spasmodic, had been rapid, conquest had led to conquest, and the treaty signed at Peking marked a stage, but not the last, in the absorption of vast regions into the Russian Empire. Checked again and again in her efforts to reach the Mediterranean, Russia had followed the line of least resistance, and though it led her far afield, she now possessed a scientific frontier on the sea. The Peking treaty was a veritable triumph of Muscovite diplomacy, extracted as it was from the Chinese at a time when, smarting from the lesson lately taught them by the Allies, they were in no humour to resist demands. But though Russia's eastward boundary was now washed by the same sea that half surrounds the Empire of Japan, her aspirations in those distant regions were unsatisfied. Along the coast line of her new possessions no ice-free port exists, and Vladivostok at its southern extremity, whither the Russian naval headquarters were moved from Nikolaievsk, lying ten degrees to the north, is closed by ice for three months of the year.* From that port, too, admission to the Pacific mainly depended on the goodwill of Japan, for the two principal avenues which open on that ocean were practically in her hands.† On the north-east, between Yezo (Hokkaido) and the main island of Hondo, is the narrow Tsugaru channel, while on the south are the straits between the southern shore of Korea and the Japanese island of Kiushu or Nine Provinces. The northern route is under Japanese control, and within the southern straits, which measure little more than

* A passage sufficient for naval vessels is now maintained by means of ice-breakers.

† See Map I.

six score miles across, are the islands of Tsushima and Ikishima well situated for guarding the passage east and west.

The problem of securing freedom of navigation to and from Vladivostok through these straits, under all conditions, could not be satisfactorily solved by Russia unless she could obtain a foothold in Southern Korea, or debar her island neighbour from acquiring one. The time for further territorial expansion on the mainland was not opportune, but there remained other means, direct and easy, that would afford the necessary access to the ocean. The island of Tsushima, which possesses several good harbours, might be occupied and added to the Tsar's domains; and with this intention, in 1861, a Russian warship landed there a party of marines. Remonstrances from the alarmed inhabitants proved of no avail, but on the appearance of a British squadron, backed by a protest from the British Minister at Yedo (Tokio), the intruders were withdrawn. Several years passed and no other attempt like that on Tsushima was made, but the necessity for an ice-free port was not lost sight of by the Russian Government.

In 1885, the situation in the Far East rendered the possession of a port in eastern waters accessible throughout the year indispensable to the Russians, and with this end in view, they entered into negotiations for the lease of Port Lazarev in North-Eastern Korea. This project was, however, subsequently abandoned, and Russia announced her intention "never to occupy Korean territory under any circumstances whatever." In the meantime the British Government had occupied Port Hamilton, in the Korean Straits, but after the Russian declaration with regard to Korea, the island was again evacuated.

The gradual approach of Russia was viewed with apprehension in Japan. Many years prior to the incidents just mentioned, and before Russia had gained possession of the Maritime Province, her settlers in Kamchatka, striving to push southwards, had given tokens of that spirit of aggression which culminated, in 1806, in depredations committed in the island of Yezo. Half a century later differences which arose regarding the ownership of Saghalien

reached a crisis and, though compounded at that time by a partition of the island, the weaker Power found herself, in 1875, forced to give up the southern half, accepting in exchange what was practically her own—the Kurile group of islands.

The shame of this surrender, though unavoidable, sank deep into the hearts of the *Samurai*, and in the minds of Japanese statesmen the dread of Russia grew. They knew that China had proved in 1860, and before, her inability to protect her own interests, and that though she posed as Suzerain of Korea, whose north-east frontier was coterminous with that of Russia, the task of keeping that dependency inviolate was beyond her strength.

To avert the danger of a Russian occupation, partial or complete, two courses were now open to the Japanese. Either Korea, whose attitude towards them from ancient causes was far from friendly, must be conquered or, failing that, made independent. The first course, for which all preparations had been made, was

abandoned, lest it should lead to outside interference and so defeat its object, and the alternative, which aimed at terminating the Chinese suzerainty, was chosen. To carry out the scheme all that was needed was the opportunity, and that was soon to come. In 1875, a few months after the decision to intervene had been arrived at,

while a Japanese steamer was engaged in fixing her position off the Korean coast by soundings, some inhabitants opened fire upon her, killing several sailors. This outrage was resented by Japan, and

served as a pretext for the opening of negotiations between herself and Korea. A treaty was the outcome, and in its terms the Suzerain Power was studiously ignored, while the offending State was regarded as an independent Power enjoying the same sovereign rights as Japan. But China, who was not to be rebuffed so easily, took measures to regain her former influence in Seoul, and in 1882, the moment came for furthering her schemes in that direction. In that year an attempt was made to assassinate the Korean King and Queen, upon which she offered to send troops for their protection. The offer was accepted and the troops were sent, and Chinese influence was once again in the ascendant at Seoul. A few months after this incident Japan's turn came to re-assert herself. The anti-foreign party at the Korean capital attacked and burned the Japanese Legation, the Minister escaping thence with difficulty to the coast. Reparation was demanded by the Tokio Government and troops were sent to Seoul, where their presence, coupled with that of the Chinese garrison, caused disturbances and led to complications which threatened to bring on a war between Japan and China. But the danger passed and, in

The Tientsin Convention. April, 1885, an agreement, called the Tientsin Convention, was signed by Marquis Ito and Li Hung-chang. According to its provisions, both countries agreed to withdraw their troops from Korea, and settled that if either Power should, in the future, find it necessary to intervene in that State with armed force, the other should receive due notice and have the right to send an equal number of troops.

By virtue of this Convention, in spite of constant friction between Korea and Japan, peace was preserved till 1894, when a wide-spread rebellion broke out against the Government of the former country. The King's troops were defeated by the rebels, and the Royal cause became so seriously imperilled that help from the Suzerain Power was earnestly besought. China complied with readiness and despatched 2,000 troops to Seoul, at the same time warning Japan of her action under the terms of the Tientsin Convention. A Japanese mixed brigade was at once mobilized, and Fusan and Chemulpo were occupied. But the troops sent by China had already quelled the rising, and when she proposed a simultaneous evacuation Japan, tired of the continuous spectacle of misrule and resolved to terminate once and for all a situation which invited foreign aggression, intimated her unwillingness to withdraw till peace was placed upon an assured foundation. With this view she demanded, as a condition of evacuation, that certain reforms should be introduced into Korea. The Chinese Government, how-

ever, peremptorily refused to admit her right to interfere, and after some negotiations, which proved fruitless, hostilities began.

The campaign, which lasted eight months, opened with the battle of Pingyang, on the 15th September, and two days later the

The Chino-
Japanese War
of 1894-5. Chinese fleet was dispersed in an engagement which took place off Hai-yeng, an island lying about seventy miles south-west of the mouth of the Ya-lu River.

The First Japanese Army then advanced to invade Manchuria, and, forcing the passage of the Ya-lu on the 25th October, occupied the country as far north as Hai-cheng by the 13th December. Meanwhile the Second Japanese Army, disembarking on the 24th October on the southern coast of the Liao-tung Peninsula, captured Chin-chou on the 6th November, and on the 21st took Port Arthur by assault. Part of the Second Army then moved north, and on the 6th March, 1895, occupied Newchwang (Ying-kou), where it joined hands with the First Army from Hai-cheng. Three days later the combined forces attacked the Chinese, who had taken up a position in great force on the right bank of the Liao River at Tien-chuang-tai, and completely routed them. Prior to this decisive engagement, an expeditionary force sent against Wei-hai-wei in February had captured that place. The Chinese, everywhere defeated, sued for an armistice, which was granted on the 30th March, and on the 10th April a treaty of peace was signed at Shimonoseki, in Japan.

The Treaty of
Shimonoseki. By its terms China recognised the "full and complete independence of Korea," ceded Formosa, the Pescadores and the Liao-tung Peninsula to Japan, and agreed to pay a war indemnity of 200,000,000 taels (£25,160,256). Pending the performance of these stipulations, Wei-hai-wei was to remain in the hands of the Japanese.

The significance of this treaty was not lost upon Russia, who realized that her whole scheme of expansion in East Asia was imperilled. With Japan installed securely in the Liao-tung Peninsula and exerting strong influence in Korea, all hope of possessing an ice-free port on the Pacific would disappear, while the possible dismemberment of China would be indefinitely postponed.

The interven-
tion of Russia,
France and
Germany. So serious a crisis demanded instant action, and this took the form of a coalition between Russia, France, and Germany. On the 20th April, before the Shimonoseki Treaty had been ratified, the representatives of those three Powers at Tokio presented a joint note to Japan, suggesting that she should forego her claim to territory on the mainland, since its retention would be prejudicial to the lasting peace of the Far East. Japan was in no position to meet so strong a combination and, simultaneously with the publication of the ratified treaty, an Imperial Rescript was issued,

Retrocession
of the Liao-
tung Peninsula. in which it was stated that the Emperor, out of regard for peace, "yielded to the dictates of magnanimity, and accepted the advice of the three Powers." As compensation for the retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula, Japan received from China 39,000,000 taels (£4,906,250).

he Trans-Siberian Railway. A digression from the sequence of events in Far East politics is necessary at this point, in order to glance at a project of great importance initiated some four years prior to the Chino-Japanese war.

For over thirty years the question of constructing a railway across Siberia had been under discussion in Russia, but it was not until the 19th May, 1891, that the first sod was turned by the Tsarevitch, now the reigning Emperor. The construction of this railway was pushed on with such energy from both the Asiatic and European termini, that five years later the eastern section had reached Khabarovsk and the western extended beyond Irkutsk to the shores of Lake Baikal, from the further side of which the line was carried on to Strietensk. The gap of about a thousand miles between Strietensk and Khabarovsk was still untouched, but the line across it was intended to follow the course of the river Amur, which is the southern boundary of Russian territory in that part of East Asia. Unfortunately, that river makes a wide bend to the north, and a railway to Vladivostok through Russian territory must make a similar detour. But towards the end of 1896, a contract was concluded between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank, whereby the Chinese Eastern Railway Company was formed to construct a railway through Manchuria from Chita, some two hundred miles west of Strietensk, to a point on the southern section of the Ussuri railway between Vladivostok and Khabarovsk. By this contract the necessity for following the vagaries of the river Amur would be avoided and a direct and far more convenient line could be made to Vladivostok.

The next link in the chain of events which preceded the struggle between Russia and Japan was the occupation of Kiao-chao Bay by Germany in 1897. This was brought about by the murder of two German missionaries in the province of Shan-tung, which was followed by negotiations lasting several months. These terminated in the grant to Germany of a ninety-nine years' lease of territory on both sides of the entrance to the bay, a zone of influence, and certain railway and mining rights. With Kiao-chao in German hands, Wei-hai-wei still held as a guarantee by the Japanese, and the prospect that Ta-lien-wan, owing to British representations, would shortly become a treaty port, Russia determined to settle the question of an ice-free port, and at the same time establish her supremacy in the Far East. In December, 1897, her warships had appeared at Port Arthur, and on the 27th March of the following year a convention was concluded with China by which Port Arthur, Ta-lien-wan and the adjacent waters were leased to Russia for twenty-five years, on the expiry of which period an extension might, by mutual agreement, be arranged. Other provisions included a neutral zone, and power to erect forts and other defences. Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan were occupied on the 28th March, 1898, and in the spring of the ensuing year the construction of the southern branch of the

Chinese Eastern Railway from Harbin to the extremity of the Liao-tung Peninsula was begun.

Immediately after the conclusion of this convention, a ninety-nine years' lease of certain territory adjacent to Hong-Kong was acquired by Great Britain, while Wei-hai-wei was also to be held by her, but only for so long as the lease of Port Arthur to Russia lasted.

Great Britain
and France
lease territory.

The conventions granting these leases were signed at Peking on 9th June and 1st July, 1898, and Wei-hai-wei, which was still in the occupation of the Japanese, pending the final payment of the Chinese war indemnity, was evacuated by them in favour of Great Britain. Earlier in the same year France had put forward a demand for the lease of Kuang-chou-wan, which was granted on the 10th April.

We now come to the two remaining stages of the prelude to the war—the Boxer Rising and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In 1899, the inflammatory edicts which were put in circulation, inciting the people to rebel against the Powers whose aggressive action since the war with Japan threatened the dismemberment of the Chinese Empire, brought on the rising. First noticed during the previous year in the Shan-tung Province as a movement against native Christians, and next aimed at Chinamen displaying foreign sympathies, it gradually spread over North China and became directed against all foreigners. Troops sent to suppress the rioters fraternized with them, the Chancellor of the Japanese Legation and the German Minister in Peking were murdered, and on the 12th June, 1900, the Legations were attacked, and then besieged. In consequence, armed intervention on the part of the Governments represented at the Chinese Capital became necessary, and on the 14th August the Legations were relieved.

Prior to this outbreak steady progress on both the Imperial Railway* and the Chinese Eastern Railway had been made. In June, 1900, the former was running trains to Newchwang with a break at the Ta-ling Ho, while the embankment of the line to Hsin-min-tun was completed. The Chinese Eastern Railway at the same time was running trains between Liao-yang and Port Arthur on an imperfectly ballasted road, and although through communication between Siberia and the termini at Vladivostok and Port Arthur was far from being established, the earth work had been completed and considerable stretches of unballasted rails had been laid. Such was the position of affairs when the Boxer outbreak, spreading to Manchuria, imposed on Russia the office of pacificator.

On the 5th July, the railway stations at Tieh-ling and Liao-yang were burnt, and the Christian Missions at Mukden destroyed; the French Roman Catholic Bishop and his staff being massacred. The railway servants fled, protected by small Cossack escorts, some north to Harbin, others to Newchwang. On the 13th July Chinese troops opened fire on the Russians from the bank of the River Amur in the neighbourhood

The Boxers in
Manchuria.

* The Imperial Railway runs from Peking to Newchwang *via* Tientsin and Shan-hai-kuan.

of Helampo, and disturbances occurred elsewhere on the Russo-Manchurian frontier. On the 26th June, the Russian Government ordered the mobilization of the troops in the Amur and Siberian Military Districts, and a few days later in the Kuan-tung Peninsula. Troops were also despatched from Europe, and forces were collected at Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Blagovieschensk, Chita and Port Arthur; but it was not until August that the Russians were in sufficient strength to cross the Amur and capture and burn Aigun. At the same time seven flying columns were organized, composed of $22\frac{1}{2}$ squadrons of cavalry and $30\frac{1}{2}$ battalions of infantry, with 96 guns. These columns entered Manchuria from different points; three were to converge on Harbin, and two on Kirin, while the remaining two from Port Arthur were to operate in the south. Harbin, which was besieged, was relieved on the 3rd August, and, by the middle of September, Sing-cheng and Kuan-cheng-tzu were occupied, while Kirin was entered by a Russian column on the 23rd September. In the south, Mukden was occupied on the 30th September, by which date the whole country was practically in the hands of the Russians. Very little resistance had been met by them, their losses amounting only to 242 killed and 1,283 wounded. Their forces in Manchuria were shortly afterwards reduced, the European units returning to Russia.

The international contingents, which had relieved the Peking Legations and occupied the province of Chih-li, had been gradually increased until they numbered about 70,000 men. The evacuation of Peking. Negotiations were carried on between the several Powers and the Chinese Government, and on the 16th January the latter agreed to the terms which had been demanded. The most important of these were the punishment of the principal authors of the outrages, an indemnity, control of the Legation quarter and the maintenance of Legation Guards, the razing of the forts at Taku and those which might impede free communication between Peking and the sea, as well as the garrisoning by foreign troops of certain points for the maintenance of that communication. At the same time the Powers agreed to withdraw their troops from Peking on the 17th September, 1901, leaving, however, the Legation Guards, the total strength of which was fixed at 2,000 men. The province of Chih-li was to be vacated five days later, but garrisons aggregating 6,200 men were to hold Tientsin, Shan-hai-kuan, and other places. By the end of August the contingents had been reduced to about 18,000 men, and during 1902 the numbers fell to the limit that had been arranged.

On the 30th January, 1902, the Governments of Great Britain and Japan, "actuated solely by a desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the extreme East, being more-over specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations," signed an agreement which was to remain in force for five years. By it each Power contracted, in the event of either of them

becoming involved in war with a third Power in defence of its interests in the extreme East, to maintain strict neutrality and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally; but should any other Power or Powers join in hostilities, to come to the assistance of its ally and conduct the war in common.

On the 16th March, 1902, a Franco-Russian declaration announced the satisfaction of the two Governments to find in the

Anglo-Japanese agreement the affirmation of the
 Franco-Russian declaration. fundamental principles which they had themselves

declared to form the basis of their policy, but reserved all right as to the means to be adopted in the case of aggressive action on the part of a third Power, or of the recurrence of disturbances in China.

This declaration was followed on the 8th April by the signing of a treaty between China and Russia, the text of which, when
 Russia agrees to evacuate Manchuria. published in the Russian *Official Messenger* four days

later, was accompanied with a fresh assurance that the Government of the Tsar adhered to the principles of the integrity and independence of China. According to this treaty Russia consented to withdraw completely from Manchuria, while China, on her part, agreed to protect the railway and Russian subjects, and their undertakings in that country. The evacuation was to be gradual and to be completed in three successive periods of six months, or eighteen months in all from the date of the signature of the agreement, and during each period a stipulated section of territory would be handed back to China. In the following October, at the end of the first six months, the evacuation began, and the south-west portion of the Mukden province was restored. The withdrawal from the second section was not, however, carried out on the date appointed. When the Chinese Minister made inquiries

at St. Petersburg, he was informed that the delay
 Russia's seven demands. was temporary and that the Emperor's commands

would be fulfilled; subsequently, however, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Peking presented a demand for further concessions regarding Manchuria. These demands, which were seven in number, were in general terms as follows:—(1) None of the territory restored to China was to be leased or sold to any other Power; (2) the existing system of government in Mongolia was not to be altered; (3) no new ports or towns were to be opened in Manchuria without notice to Russia; (4) the authority of foreigners in the Chinese service was not to extend over affairs in the northern province; (5) the Newchwang-Peking telegraph line was to be maintained; (6) on Newchwang being restored to China the Customs' receipts were to continue to be paid into the Russo-Chinese Bank; (7) the rights acquired by Russian subjects or foreign companies during the occupation were to be respected.

Protests from the representatives of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan were lodged against these demands, and on the 29th April the Chinese Government finally intimated their refusal to comply with them.

Meanwhile events in Korea had also aroused alarm in Japan. Although the Chino-Japanese war had settled the question of Chinese

interference, a strong anti-Japanese party existed in Korea, which, headed by the Queen, opposed the partisans of reform, and created a general feeling of unrest throughout the country. During an attempt made on the 8th October, 1895, by the King's father and some of the reformers to enter the palace for the purpose of presenting a plan of reform, the Queen was assassinated. On the 11th July, 1896, a rising in Northern Korea induced the King to take refuge in the Russian Legation, where he issued an order which resulted in the murder of the prime minister and two of his colleagues in office. The Japanese Government now appear to have accepted Russian co-operation, for by a memorandum dated Seoul, 14th May, and an arrangement dated Moscow, 9th June, 1896, several possible causes of misunderstanding were removed, and it was eventually agreed to recommend the King to return to his palace, to employ liberal and moderate men as ministers, and to suppress all useless expenditure. It was arranged that Japan should retain three companies of infantry, to be replaced as soon as possible by military police, to protect the Fusan-Seoul telegraph line, while companies not exceeding two hundred men each were to guard the Japanese settlements, two being stationed at Seoul, a company at Fusan, and another at Gensan. Russia on her side was to maintain forces of similar strength for the protection of her legation and consulates.

By a further agreement of three Articles, dated Tokio, 25th April, 1898, the two Governments (1) definitely recognized the independence of Korea, and pledged themselves mutually to abstain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country; (2) agreed to take no measure in respect to the appointment of military instructors or provincial advisers, without previous mutual understanding; and (3) the Russian Government agreed not to hinder the development of commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea.

In 1897 a Russo-Korean bank had been founded, and Russian subjects began to take considerable interest in land purchase and concessions. A year earlier a Russian merchant had secured the right, with a monopoly for twenty-five years, to cut timber on the Ya-lu and Tumen Rivers, but work was not commenced upon the undertaking until April, 1903. Then Russian aggression, which had so far been limited to Manchuria, became noticeable in Northern Korea, and advantage of the timber concession was taken to occupy Yongampo, at the mouth of the Ya-lu River, with Russian troops. Other acts followed from which it became apparent that Russia had little or no intention of adhering to her agreement with Japan.

The issues both in Korea and Manchuria had now reached a point where representations on the part of Japan were unavoidable. On the 28th July, 1903, her Minister at St. Petersburg was instructed that it was considered that Russia, by the seven demands enumerated above, was consolidating rather than relaxing her hold on Manchuria, compelling the belief that she had abandoned her intention of retiring from that territory, while her increased

Russia's action
in Korea.

Russo-Japanese
negotiations.

activity on the Korean frontier was such as to raise doubts regarding the limit of her ambition; that the permanent occupation of Manchuria would create a condition of affairs prejudicial to the security and interests of Japan; that Russia, stationed on the flank of Korea, would be a constant menace to the separate existence of that kingdom, where Japan possessed paramount political as well as commercial and industrial interests, which for her own security Japan was not prepared to surrender or to share with any other Power. The Minister was therefore authorized to intimate the readiness of his Government to enter upon *pourparlers* with that of Russia, who, on being informed, replied accepting the suggestion. Thereupon a draft treaty, in which their proposals were set forth, was drawn up by the Tokio Cabinet. This draft consisted of six Articles, and was to the following effect:—

- (1) A mutual agreement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean Empires.
- (2) A reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea; Russia's special interests in railway enterprise in Manchuria; and the right of Japan to take in Korea, and of Russia to take in Manchuria, such measures as might be necessary for the protection of their several interests, subject, however, to Article (1).
- (3) A reciprocal undertaking not to impede the development of Japan's industrial and commercial activities in Korea, nor Russia's in Manchuria. Russia was to engage not to hinder the extension of the Korean railway into Manchuria.
- (4) A reciprocal engagement that if either Power found it necessary to take military measures for the protection of her interests as set forth in Article (2), the troops should not exceed the actual number required and should be recalled as soon as as their mission was accomplished.
- (5) A recognition on the part of Russia of the exclusive right of Japan to give advice and assistance in the interests of reform and good government in Korea, including necessary military assistance.
- (6) All previous agreements respecting Korea were to be abrogated.

This draft was presented at St. Petersburg on the 12th August, 1903. The Russian Government consented to negotiate, but insisted upon Tokio being made the place of meeting. On the 3rd October, the Russian counter-proposals were presented to Japan. They omitted all reference to China and Manchuria except in Article (7), which stated that "Manchuria and its littoral [was] to be recognised by Japan as outside her sphere of interest." The territory of Korea north of the 39th parallel was proposed as a neutral zone; no part of the territory of Korea was to be used for "strategic purposes," nor were any military works, capable of menacing the freedom of navigation of the Straits of Korea, to be undertaken on its coasts. In general, the proposals of Japan with

regard to Korea alone were accepted as the basis of negotiation, but by limiting her treaty to that country, except in one significant particular, restrictions were imposed upon Japan there, while Russia was left free to do as she pleased in Manchuria.

In the negotiations which followed between 16th October, 1903, and 13th January, 1904, six further drafts of agreement were exchanged. Japan accepted the proposal of a neutral zone, but with the limitation that it should extend to fifty kilometres on each side of the Ya-lu, and acceded to the demand that Manchuria should be considered outside her sphere of interest, provided that Russia gave a similar undertaking with regard to Korea. She further consented not to fortify the straits, but the reference to "strategic purposes" in the same Article was expunged. Russia, however, continued to endeavour to exclude Manchuria from the agreement on the plea that that was "a question exclusively between Russia and China," and that although "Russia once took possession of Manchuria by right of conquest, nevertheless she is willing to restore it to China, but with certain guarantees assuring security to the enormous interests which Russia has in Manchuria. While China is still insisting on her refusal to give such guarantees, it is not possible for Russia to come to any agreement with a third Power respecting Manchuria, as the question is exclusively between the two countries concerned."

On the 13th January, 1904, Japan replied for the last time, accepting the Russian proposal that she should regard Manchuria as being outside her sphere of influence, on condition of a similar engagement by Russia as regards Korea. In presenting the last draft to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Japanese Minister was instructed to request an early reply; for it was known that Russia was actively engaged in endeavouring to improve her military and naval position, by sending reinforcements of men and ships to the Far East.

No reply being received, the Japanese Government decided, on the 4th February, to terminate the negotiations, and on the 6th their Minister at St. Petersburg informed Count Lamsdorff that he had been directed to sever diplomatic relations and to withdraw from the Russian capital.

CHAPTER II.

THE WAR STRENGTH OF JAPAN.

IN 1871 the system of conscription was first introduced into Japan, but it was not put into full force throughout the Empire until two years later. Up to 1868 feudalism had prevailed, under which each feudal lord or *Daimyo* maintained as many retainers—*Samurai* or *Shizoku*—as his finances would permit, but the restoration of administrative power to the Emperor, which took place in that year, and the increasing danger of western aggression rendered necessary a radical change in the military system of the country. Patriotism and loyalty to the Sovereign were to replace the narrower forms of duty to the feudal lord and readiness to die at his command. Clans and tribal groupings were to disappear, and the ancient loyalty, built up by a thousand years of war, was to be diverted into broader channels, and one supreme form of national sentiment—obedience to the dictates of the Emperor—evolved.

The new order of things put an end to the domination of the *Samurai* and, though at first it was feared that the other classes of the people—farmers, artisans and tradesmen—about to be included in the Army might lack the military spirit, subsequent events showed no cause for this fear. Loyalty in the feudal days had not been confined to the fighting classes, and the paramount duty of fitting himself to defend his native soil roused the latent patriotic spirit in the breast of every Japanese.

In deciding to adapt her Army to modern conditions Japan took what was best and most suited to her needs from European systems, and in the work of military regeneration she was from time to time aided by foreign officers. Ultimately, however, all outside assistance was dispensed with and her own picked officers were sent to Europe to complete their studies. On their return they received appointments in which the knowledge gained abroad could best be utilized and, in course of time, permeate the Army. As a model for a General Staff, that of Germany was taken, and a corps of highly-trained and able officers was created, to whose labours both at home and in the field, much of the credit of her many brilliant victories is due.

But however indebted Japan may have been to external help in evolving the formidable military machine which she now possesses, she owes to no one that wondrous spirit of self-sacrifice which animates the heart of every man—soldier or sailor—and makes him feel it a privilege to give his life, if by that means the welfare of

the nation may be advanced. The whole Army is imbued with the strongest sense of duty. The officers of all ranks are devoted to their profession and are educated to a pitch as near perfection as it is possible to attain. The men, as a whole, are highly intelligent and, thanks to the simple and frugal life led by them from early childhood, are possessed of great endurance, boundless patience and capacity for fighting under difficulties.

Every Japanese between the ages of seventeen and forty who is physically fit is liable to serve either in the Army or Navy. Military service does not, however, usually begin until a man has reached his twentieth year, although between the ages of seventeen and twenty voluntary enlistment is permitted.

At the outbreak of the war, military service* was divided into four categories:—

					Terms of Service. Years.
(1) Standing Army (<i>Jobi</i>) subdivided into —					
(a)	Active Army (<i>Genyeki</i>)	3
(b)	First Reserve (<i>Yobi</i>)	4½
(2)	Reserve Army or Second Reserve (<i>Kobi</i>)	5
(3) Conscript Reserve (<i>Hoju</i>) subdivided into—					
1st Term	7½
2nd Term	1½

The men belonging to the Second Reserve were those who had completed their service in the Standing Army, and both they and the men of the First Reserve were called out for periodical training. The First Term of the Conscript Reserve (*Hoju*) consisted of those men who, though liable to conscription and medically fit, had escaped service with the colours; and the Second Term of those similarly liable and qualified, who had escaped not only service with the colours but also the lot of service with the First Term. The men of the First Term received a preliminary training of ninety days' drill, under regular officers, and a further training of sixty days during the second and fourth years of service; they were liable, however, like the German *Ersatz Reserve*, to be called up to fill vacancies in the Standing and Reserve Armies. The men of the Second Term were untrained, and, after completing their period of purely nominal service, were passed into the Second Section of the National Army.

- (4) National Army (*Kokumin*) subdivided into—
- | | |
|-------------|-------------------------------------------|
| 1st Section | } Formed of men up to forty years of age. |
| 2nd Section | |

The First Section consisted of men between twenty and forty years of age who had completed their service in the Reserve Army or in the First Term of the Conscript Reserve. The Second Section consisted of all men between the ages of twenty and forty not belonging to other categories, and was quite untrained.

* The military system which existed in Japan at the outbreak of the war has undergone no fundamental changes since its termination.

By an Imperial Ordinance dated 29th September, 1904, which had retrospective effect, the liability to serve in the Reserve Army was increased from five to ten years; and the two terms of Conscript Reserve were amalgamated, and service in it was increased to twelve and one-third years.

The total number of youths annually available for enrolment exceeded 430,000, and over 60,000 were taken for service with the colours, while fully 130,000 were drafted into the *Hojū*. The exact number of men in the various categories in February, 1904, is not known, as the figures of the annual contingents have seldom been published, but it may be taken to be approximately as follows:—

Active Army	180,000
First Reserve	200,000
Reserve Army	200,000
Trained Conscript Reserve	50,000
Trained men of the National Army	220,000
					<hr/>
					850,000
Untrained men liable for service in the					
Conscript Reserve	250,000
Untrained men available for service in					
the National Army, based on the pop-					
ulation of 46 millions in 1898	4,000,000

When the five younger classes of the trained men of the National Army, probably 120,000 in number, were transferred to the Reserve Army in September, 1904, by the Imperial Ordinance referred to above, there were available for field service some 750,000 men with 18,000 officers.

In 1904 the Japanese Standing Army consisted of thirteen divisions, namely, the Imperial Guard Division and twelve territorial divisions, two cavalry brigades, two artillery brigades, the garrisons of Formosa and of various fortresses, and certain guards in Korea.

The twelve territorial divisions were grouped into three Armies of four divisional districts each, for inspectional purposes, but as this arrangement was departed from at the outbreak of the war, the division must be regarded as the real unit of Japanese organization. When mobilized, each division,* which is a unit complete in itself, consisted in round numbers of 11,400 rifles, 430 sabres and 36 guns, with staff, 830 engineers and 5,500 non-combatants. Each divisional district also provided on mobilization a Second Reserve (*Kobi*) brigade composed of two regiments of infantry, each regiment containing two battalions, in all some 3,500 men. In some of these districts mixed brigades were formed, composed of a Second Reserve brigade of two regiments of three battalions, three batteries of field artillery, a company of engineers and a few troopers as orderlies, the whole amounting to some 5,000 men.

Dépôt units were also organized, each infantry regiment forming a battalion, each cavalry regiment a squadron, each

* For details of a mobilized division and a Second Reserve (*Kobi*) brigade, see note on page 25.

artillery regiment a battery, to keep its own regiment and the affiliated *Kobi* unit up to strength.

Line of communication troops for each division were at first furnished by the *Kobi*, and afterwards by the depôt troops, who were thus close at hand to replace casualties, and were themselves kept up to strength by drafts from the depôts in Japan, where fresh units were continually being formed for training.

The two cavalry brigades consisted each of two regiments, and in each regiment were four squadrons. The total number of sabres in the two brigades amounted to 2,300.

The two artillery brigades, each of three regiments, had a total of 216 guns.

The garrison of Formosa, which was replaced by reserve troops, consisted of three mixed brigades, making a total of eleven battalions, three squadrons, eleven batteries, and three engineer companies, or in round numbers 11,000 rifles, 430 sabres, and 66 guns.

The Japanese troops in Korea, kept as guards for the settlements under agreement with Russia consisted of two companies of infantry at Seoul, one company at Fusan and one at Gensan, total 800 men,* and there were also small posts of military police along the Japanese telegraph lines totalling 200 men.

The Field Troops available were therefore approximately :—

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
13 divisions	148,200	5,590	456	10,790
13 <i>Kobi</i> brigades†... ..	45,500	—	78	—
Depôt troops	52,000	2,600	78	2,990
2 cavalry brigades	—	2,300	—	—
2 artillery brigades	—	—	216	—
Formosa garrison	11,000	433	66	690
Guards, etc., in Korea	1,000	—	—	—
Total	257,700	10,923	894	14,470

Some 400,000 trained men in addition were available to replace casualties.

Four additional divisions—the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th—were formed during 1904, as well as a similar number of *Kobi* brigades, raising the total number of divisions and *Kobi* brigades to sixteen. In this number the Guard Division is not included. Beyond these units no new formations were created during the war, and the recruits and reservists called to the depôts were used exclusively to keep the original units up to strength. At first none but men with at least a year's training were sent to the front as combatants, but at a later period of the war it was found that the term of instruction could be reduced without detriment to six months.

* It is believed that these troops belonged to the 12th Division.

† The figures in this line represent the strength in men and guns of 13 normal *Kobi* brigades.

The system of training in force in Japan prior to the war closely resembled that of Germany, and the tactical books of instruction were based on those of the latter country.

The cavalry, like that of European Powers, was trained principally for shock action, but was also taught to fight on foot. The men were selected from among the most intelligent and best suited for this arm of the service, but they were not good riders, and their horses were overweighted.

The artillery was trained to open an action, and to work with the battalion of three batteries as a unit wherever ground admitted. Isolated action on the part of batteries was regarded with disfavour, and only to be employed in hilly or broken country where space would necessarily be limited. Great stress was laid upon the importance of concealing guns from view and fire, and earthworks were ordered to be made whenever possible.

The infantry was taught that the great object of the attack was to obtain superiority of fire; that the aim of every man must be to press forward regardless of loss, and that any wavering or lack of dash would lead to increased casualties and diminish the prospects of success. It was laid down that the deployment would be made under cover of artillery, and the troops pushed as close to the enemy's position, before opening fire, as the nature of the ground admitted. The difficulty of crossing the fire-swept zone by day was recognized, and much time was devoted to practice in night operations. The distinguishing feature of the attack lay in the rapidity with which the men moved from point to point; at the same time the operation was characterized by deliberation and neither reconnaissance nor entrenching was forgotten.

The cavalry was armed with swords, and the 1900 pattern of carbine, taking the same cartridge as the rifle, was slung on the back. In the field the amount of ammunition was increased and ninety rounds were carried by each man. With each cavalry brigade was a battery of six Hotchkiss machine guns.

Five of the infantry divisions, the Guard Division the four additional divisions, and the two artillery brigades were armed with the Arisaka field gun, which is not a quick-firing gun. It has a calibre of 2·95-in., a muzzle velocity of 1,600 f.s., and throws either a shrapnel shell of 13·23 lbs. in weight or a high explosive shell weighing 13·45 lbs. to a range of 5,000 yards. Six of the divisions had mountain guns of the same calibre as the field artillery, and these, though of less range, proved most effective. One division, the 7th, had two batteries of field and two of mountain guns. In addition to the field and mountain guns some batteries of howitzers of 4·72-in. calibre were used as corps artillery.

The infantry was armed with the 1900 pattern of rifle and bayonet. The rifle had a calibre of ·256-in. and a muzzle velocity of 2,300 f.s., and was sighted up to 3,000 metres (3,280 yards). The ammunition was made up in clips of five rounds, and each man had one hundred and twenty rounds in pouches and thirty in the haversack, while an additional sixty rounds were carried in

the battalion transport. The number of rounds taken into action was on an average two hundred, but was sometimes increased to three hundred and eighty.

Kits were carried in knapsacks with the greatcoat and shelter-tent rolled outside. Two-thirds of the men carried an entrenching tool, which was strapped to the knapsack, in which, in addition to necessities, were two days' rations; the whole weighed some 57 lbs.

An important item of the soldier's kit was the blue cloth holdall. This took the form of a sack six feet six inches long, but with both ends open, and was eight and a half inches across when laid flat. It was made of stout blue drill, and was sewn across the centre so as to form two long compartments. It was used by men, such as those of the train, who were not provided with knapsacks, to carry their kit. With the regular soldier, however, it served to carry ammunition in one compartment and emergency rations in the other. It was usually carried empty, but when it was known that a severe action was impending, the knapsack and its contents were discarded, the emergency rations were transferred to one of the compartments of the blue holdall, and as much as two hundred and thirty rounds were sometimes placed in the other compartment. The sack was then worn over the right shoulder *en bandoulière* by tying the two ends across the chest. This equipment was improvised owing to the necessity of carrying as much ammunition as possible into action.

At the beginning of the war the infantry was not accompanied by machine guns, but during the autumn of 1904 ten machine guns of Hotchkiss pattern were supplied to each division, and before March of the following year, this number was increased to fourteen. The organization adopted for these weapons was two batteries, each of six guns, and one section of two guns.

The bridging section of each engineer battalion had material for throwing a bridge one hundred and fifty-three yards long, and with each telegraph company were some thirty-five miles of air line and cable.

Service in the Japanese Navy, as in the Army, is compulsory, but a large number of the men are volunteers, who engage for eight years' active service and four years in the reserve. The modern Japanese fleet has, to a large extent, been constructed at British shipbuilding yards and the system of training is very similar to that in force in the British Navy.

At the outbreak of the war Japan had six battleships of the first and one of the second class, six first-class, twelve second-class, and thirteen third-class cruisers, fourteen gun-boats, nineteen destroyers and seventy-eight torpedo boats. Besides these, two first-class cruisers were bought at Genoa shortly before hostilities began.

NAVAL FORCES OF JAPAN.

Name and classification.	Displacement.	I.H.P.	Measured mile speed.	Gun protection.	Armament.
	Tons.		Knots.	Inches.	
BATTLESHIPS.					
<i>First Class.</i>					
Fuji	12,450	14,100	18.5	14	4 12-in., 10 6-in., and 24 smaller guns.
Yoshima	12,330	14,000	19.2	14	Ditto. ditto.
Shikishima	14,850	15,000	19.0	14	4 12-in., 14 6-in., and 32 smaller guns.
Asahi	15,200	16,000	18.3	14	Ditto. ditto.
Hatsuse	14,987	15,200	19.1	14	Ditto. ditto.
Mikasa	14,500	16,525	18.5	14	Ditto. ditto.
<i>Second Class.</i>					
Chinyen	7,220	—	14.2	14	4 12-in., 4 6-in., and 10 smaller guns.
COAST DEFENCE VESSELS.					
COAST DEFENCE VESSELS AND CRUISERS.					
Fuso	3,717	2,162	11.6	8	4 9.4-in., 4 6-in., and 15 smaller guns.
Hei-yen	2,067	2,400	11.2	8	1 10.2-in., 2 5.9-in., and 8 smaller guns.
CRUISERS.					
<i>First Class.</i>					
Asama	9,700	20,550	22.09	6	4 8-in., 14 6-in., and 19 smaller guns.
Tokiwa	9,700	20,550	22.73	6	Ditto. ditto.
Adzuma	9,436	17,000	21.00	6	4 8-in., 12 6-in., and 20 smaller guns.
Yakumo	9,850	17,195	21.00	7	Ditto. ditto.
Idzumo	9,750	17,500	22.04	6	4 8-in., 14 6-in., and 20 smaller guns.
Iwate	9,750	17,500	21.75	6	Ditto. ditto.
<i>Second Class.</i>					
Naniwa	3,727	7,120	18.7	2	8 6-in., and 16 smaller guns.
Takachiho	3,727	7,120	18.7	2	2 10.2-in., 6 5.9-in., and 16 smaller guns.
Itsukushima	4,210	5,400	16.0	12	1 12.6-in., 11 4.7-in., and 19 smaller guns.
Matsushima	4,210	5,400	16.0	12	1 12.6-in., 12 4.7-in., and 16 smaller guns.
Hashidate	4,210	5,400	16.0	12	1 12.6-in., 11 4.7-in., and 19 smaller guns.
Akitsuushima	3,100	8,516	19.0	—	4 6-in., 6 4.7-in., and 12 smaller guns.
Yoshino	4,180	15,750	22.5	4	4 6-in., 8 4.7-in., and 22 smaller guns.
Takasago	4,180	15,500	22.5	4½	2 8-in., 10 4.7-in., and 18 smaller guns.
Kasagi	4,784	15,500	22.7	—	Ditto. ditto.
Ohitose	4,898	15,319	22.7	—	Ditto. ditto.
Niitaka	3,365	9,400	20.0	—	6 6-in., and 14 smaller guns.
Tsushima	3,365	9,400	20.0	—	Ditto. ditto.

In addition to the above, there were 13 third-class cruisers of 1,250-2,920 tons displacement, 14 gun boats, 19 destroyers, 49 first-class and 29 second-class torpedo boats.

Shortly before the outbreak of war, Japan purchased at Genoa from the Argentine Government two vessels named *Bernadino Rivadavia* and *Mariano Moreno*, renaming them *Kasuga* and *Nishin*. These were sister ships, armoured cruisers of 7,750 tons displacement, and 20 knots speed; the former had one 10-in. gun, two 8-in. and fourteen 6-in. guns; and the latter four 8-in. and fourteen 6-in. guns. They reached Yokosuka near Yokohama on the 16th February, 1904.

NOTE.

COMPOSITION OF A JAPANESE MOBILIZED DIVISION.

2 infantry brigades, each brigade of two regiments of three battalions.

1 cavalry regiment of three squadrons.

1 artillery regiment of two battalions of three batteries.*

1 engineer battalion of three companies with a bridging train.

1 telegraph company of three sections.

6 field hospitals.

5 ammunition columns (three artillery, two infantry).

4 supply columns.

In round numbers 11,400 rifles, 430 sabres and 36 guns, with staff, 830 engineers and 5,500 non-combatants.

COMPOSITION OF A SECOND RESERVE (*Kobi*) BRIGADE.

1 infantry brigade of two regiments, each regiment of two battalions.

In round numbers 3,500 infantry.

COMPOSITION OF A "MIXED" SECOND RESERVE (*Kobi*) BRIGADE.†

1 infantry brigade of two regiments, each regiment of three battalions.

1 artillery battalion of three batteries.

1 company of engineers.

A few troopers from the divisional cavalry regiment.

$\frac{1}{2}$ a divisional train.

1 supply column.

$\frac{1}{2}$ a bearer company.

1 or 2 field hospitals.

1 infantry ammunition column.

1 artillery ammunition column.

In round numbers 5,000 combatants and 18 guns.

* The Guard, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th Divisions, were armed with field guns; the 5th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Divisions had mountain guns, and the 7th Division had only four 6-gun batteries, two of which had field and two mountain guns.

† The Guard "Mixed" (*Kobi*) Brigade had four field batteries.

CHAPTER III.

THE WAR STRENGTH OF RUSSIA.

IN Russia, as in Japan, the motive spirit of the Army lies in the devotion of the soldiers to the Emperor. This almost amounts to a religion, and embodies everything which in other countries is understood as patriotism. The Russian soldier, coming mostly from the peasant class, is no stranger to a hard, laborious and frugal life, and it is not to be wondered at that he bears privation and endures discomfort without a murmur. The dull surroundings of his village home deaden his imagination and produce a stolid nature which, even after frequent defeats, is usually proof against sudden panic or disorganization. His natural submissiveness makes him obedient and respectful to his superiors, but limited education, and wits dulled by a purely agricultural life, give to his mind a superstitious and fatalistic bent. Brave and well-disciplined, he is steady under fire, and, when well led, is a very formidable enemy, possessing many admirable military attributes, both actual and potential. His officers, like himself, are brave, and form a body of men of the most varying degrees of education and social standing. The General Staff is highly educated, theoretically, and its members, nearly all of whom are graduates of the Russian Staff College, obtain very rapid advancement, while a proportion of its numbers are men of great capacity and knowledge.

The period of military service in the Russian army extends from the twenty-first to the forty-third year of a man's age, of which the first eighteen years are passed in the standing army and its reserve, the remainder in the *Opolchenie* or National Militia. Service with the colours lasts for five years, and in the reserve for thirteen, during the last of which periods the man is liable to two trainings of six weeks each. The actual time, however, during which the soldier remains with the colours is four years,* as it is customary to send him to the reserve at the expiration of that period.

The National Militia comprises all men fit to bear arms from their twenty-first to the end of their forty-third year, and is divided into two bans.

The Cossacks, the inhabitants of Finland, and the Christian native population of the Caucasus, serve under special regulations. Muhammadans pay a tax instead of serving personally, but are allowed to volunteer for service in certain cases.

* Since the conclusion of the war with Japan, colour service for the infantry and field artillery has been reduced to three years, and in the case of other arms to four years; service in the reserve being fifteen and fourteen years respectively.

Organization. The total number of trained men at Russia's disposal at the commencement of 1904 was as follows:—

Active army	1,100,000
Reserve of active army	2,400,000
Cossack troops	345,000
Caucasian native troops... ..	12,000
National Militia... ..	684,000
<hr/>	
Total	4,541,000 men.

For war purposes the army is classified as follows:—

Field troops (of which part expand upon mobilization, and in time of peace are styled "reserve" troops), dépôt troops, fortress troops, local troops, and National Militia.

The field troops comprise the units of the standing army brought up to war strength by means of the reserve, and reserve units expanded upon mobilization.

The dépôt troops are formed upon cadres detached from the standing army, and filled up by men not required for the mobilization of the active army, by recruits, etc. They serve to feed the field and fortress troops in time of war.

The fortress and local troops are completed to war strength in the same manner as the field troops. In war they are used for garrison work only.

The National Militia in war time forms independent units for home defence, and may also be utilized to fill up gaps among the field troops.

The standing army at the commencement of 1904 consisted of the following units:—

- (a) In European Russia and the Caucasus, twenty-five Army Corps.
- (b) In Turkistan, two Turkistan Army Corps.
- (c) In Eastern Siberia, two Siberian Army Corps.
- (d) In various parts of the Empire, a number of independent cavalry divisions and brigades, rifle brigades and other troops not included in any Army Corps.

The composition of an Army Corps varies considerably, according to the part of the Empire in which it is stationed. Thus in European Russia the normal Army Corps consists of:—

Two infantry divisions, each consisting of two brigades (each of two regiments of four battalions), one artillery brigade of six or eight batteries,* one sapper company, and administrative services.

One cavalry division of two brigades, each of two regiments of six squadrons, with two horse artillery batteries (twelve guns).

* In every Army Corps one artillery brigade has 6, the other 8 batteries, making a total of 14 batteries or 112 guns, or 124 guns, if the two horse batteries of the cavalry division be included.

Corps engineers, consisting of one sapper company, one telegraph company and half a pontoon battalion.

Administrative services, etc.

In round numbers, 28,000 rifles, 3,400 sabres, with 124 guns.

In Siberia, however, infantry divisions did not at the commencement of the war exist,* and cavalry divisions were not included in Army Corps, which also had fewer guns than a European Army Corps; altogether the organization of the Siberian Army Corps was of a provisional and defective nature. As the war went on, the Siberian Army Corps organization was gradually improved, and the number of Army Corps was increased from two to seven.

The composition of the various Army Corps which took part in the war, therefore, varied according to the part of the Empire from which they were drawn; the various types and established strengths were as follows:—

- (a) Army Corps of the active army from European Russia (1st, IVth, VIIIth, Xth, XVIth, XVIIth), numbering 28,000 rifles, and 112 guns each. (The XIXth, IXth and XIIIth Army Corps were sent to Manchuria, but too late to take part in the war.)
- (b) Army Corps expanded from "reserve" units in European Russia (5th and 6th Siberian Army Corps), numbering 28,000 rifles, and 96 guns. Of the 7th Siberian Army Corps (53rd and 71st Divisions), whose formation was approved by the Tsar on the 1st July, 1905, only the 71st Division† actually took part in the war.
- (c) Army Corps expanded from Siberian "reserve" units (4th Siberian Army Corps), numbering 28,000 rifles and 64 guns.
- (d) The 1st and 3rd Siberian Army Corps, composed of East Siberian units, numbering 22,000 rifles and 64 guns.
- (e) The 2nd Siberian Army Corps was composed partly of East Siberian units and partly of Siberian reserve units, numbering 27,000 rifles and 80 guns.

The cavalry, consisting almost entirely of Cossacks, was organized at the outset in separate divisions and brigades. No divisional or corps cavalry was provided for, but was detailed from cavalry divisions as required. The established strength of a cavalry division was, in round numbers, 3,400 sabres and lances, with, in some cases, 12 horse artillery guns.

About one hundred infantry depôt battalions were formed during the war for the purpose of keeping the units at the front supplied with men. Of these, at least forty proceeded to the Far East, but the exact number is not known. The other arms were supplied, partly by depôt units formed in the Far East, partly from depôts in European Russia, and partly by drafts of men serving with units in European Russia.

* They were formed later by the expansion of the existing brigades.

† The 71st Division, for a time, formed part of the 5th Siberian Army Corps, until replaced by another division.

Fortress troops were stationed at Port Arthur, Vladivostok, Possiet and Nikolaievsk, and consisted of infantry, artillery, and engineer units. At Nikolaievsk was stationed a fortress infantry regiment of one battalion, which was subsequently increased to four battalions. The infantry portion of the garrisons of Port Arthur and Vladivostok was supplied by four East Siberian rifle divisions, two to each fortress: each division comprised about 11,000 rifles and from 24 to 32 guns. Two of these divisions had been converted from Fortress Infantry into Rifles shortly before the war.

Troops for lines of communication were provided by independent battalions of Siberian infantry, Trans-Baikal Cossack infantry, Frontier Guards, and battalions of Siberian *Opolchenie*.

The Manchurian and Ussuri railways were worked entirely by railway battalions. Of these, six were East Siberian battalions, which were reinforced in the course of the war by several battalions brought from European Russia.

The system of tactical training was not unlike that of other European armies. Thus the cavalry was trained both for

Tactical training. mounted and dismounted combat, but the musketry training, necessary to make it efficient when on foot, fell short of the requirements of modern war.

The Cossacks, who formed the greater part of the Russian mounted force in Manchuria, were trained on lines similar to the regular cavalry, but did not attain to the standard laid down for the latter. Moreover, as the Cossack provides his own horse, uniform, and equipment, for which he is inadequately compensated in case of loss or damage, he is naturally disinclined to expose them to greater risk than he can help.

In the Russian artillery the tactical unit is the brigade of two, three or four batteries. Indirect laying was little taught in peace time, though during the war it was much resorted to, and gun-pits were employed whenever circumstances permitted. At the beginning of the war the artillery was in process of augmentation and rearmament, and in many of the batteries officers and men had little or no knowledge of their new quick-firing gun.

The infantry was trained in the belief that battles are won by movements in close order and shock tactics rather than by the development of a well-aimed fire, and, although the regulations prescribed the usual attack formations, these were not closely followed. Extended order was disliked as tending to increase the difficulties of command, and to this fact is mainly due the heavy losses of the Russians in Manchuria as compared with those of the Japanese. A peculiarity of the Russian infantry soldier is that both in peace time and in the field he carries his bayonet fixed, and this, together with inadequate attention to rifle shooting, naturally inclined him to place his faith in cold steel rather than in bullets.

The cavalry was armed with sword, rifle and bayonet, and Armament, etc. though the Cossacks in Manchuria did not carry the latter weapon the front rank of the majority of their regiments had the lance. The rifle was slung across the back and

was practically identical with that carried by the infantry. Of ammunition forty-five rounds were carried on the person and twenty-four in the regimental transport. The Cossacks were indifferently mounted, but the ponies they rode were possessed of great endurance.

The artillery, as has been already mentioned, was in course of rearmament when the war broke out, and there were several patterns of guns in Manchuria. At first only about one-third of the guns available were the new 3-in. Q.F. weapon, the remainder, with the exception of some batteries of mountain guns and howitzers, being guns of 3.42 in. calibre. The 3-in. Q.F. gun throws a shell weighing 13.6 lbs. to a distance of 6,000 yards, up to which range only the time fuze for shrapnel fire is graduated, while the older 3.42-in. pattern, though it has a heavier projectile, has a lesser range.

The infantry was armed with a rifle of .299-in. calibre, sighted up to 3,000 paces, with a muzzle velocity of 2,000 f.s. The ammunition was made up in clips of five rounds, and each man had one hundred and twenty rounds,* while in the regimental ammunition carts were sixty-six rounds more per man. An additional fifteen rounds were carried in Manchuria in the kit bag and a further supply in pockets in the blouse, so that from two hundred to three hundred rounds were frequently taken into action.

Kits were carried in a waterproof canvas bag suspended over the right shoulder and hanging in rear of the left buttock. In this bag were also two and a half days' biscuit and salt. The great coat was worn or rolled *en bandoulière* over the left shoulder, together with a portion of a shelter tent, and about eighty men in each company had spades. With extra ammunition, kettle and other personal effects, the weight carried amounted to about 70 lbs. or nearly 10 lbs. more than that laid down by regulation.

Machine gun companies, each of eight guns, now form part of every infantry and rifle division and rifle brigade of the line, but as regards the units at the seat of war, up to May, 1905, machine gun companies had been formed only for five East Siberian rifle divisions, for the divisions of six Army Corps, and for five rifle brigades of the line. The weapon used was the Maxim automatic gun firing the infantry cartridge, and proved to be a great success.

The pontoon battalions of engineers had material for throwing a bridge varying in length from two hundred and thirty-three to four hundred yards, according to whether it was required to carry siege artillery or the other arms, and with each sapper battalion the first and second companies had a light bridge park which was carried on six wagons.

European telegraph companies had forty miles of wire and cable, while East Siberian sapper units had four air-line sections, each section with about sixteen and a half miles of wire. There were also with the army in Manchuria three telegraph companies

* Two pouches with 30 rounds in each pouch; 30 in a bandolier slung over the left shoulder, and 30 in a reserve pouch suspended by a strap over the right shoulder and fastened to the waistbelt on the left side.

with Marconi equipment for the purpose of maintaining communication between the Commander-in-Chief and commanders of Armies.

The Russian forces in the Far East have been subject to considerable variations in their organization and strength.

Originally, a comparatively small force was maintained east of Lake Baikal, which sufficed for the Russian forces in the Far East, February, 1904. garrisons of the frontier districts and the Littoral Province, extending from the mouth of the Amur to Vladivostok. The strength of these troops, however, was gradually increased as the advent of the Siberian Railway and other considerations enhanced the importance of the vast region lying between Lake Baikal and the Pacific, an area which is known as the Russian Pri-Amur Military District.

In the summer of 1900, as has been already mentioned, the Boxer outbreak resulted in damage to large portions of the line then under construction across Manchuria *via* Harbin to Vladivostok, as well as to that leading from Harbin to Port Arthur. For the purpose of the campaign then undertaken by the Russians to re-establish their possession of the railway line, and to ensure its ultimate completion, the troops in the Far East were mobilized and reinforcements brought from European Russia. In the middle of July the order to mobilize was issued, and in October, the Russian troops, including those in the Kuan-tung District, numbered about 124,000 men.* In the middle of October, on demobilization, the Russian troops were reduced to forty battalions and twenty squadrons with seventy-four guns, or about 38,000 men, exclusive of the garrison of Kuan-tung, which numbered 14,600 men with 24 field guns. Four brigades of Frontier Guards, numbering 25,000 men, were then formed for the protection of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

In April, 1902, under the pledge given to China, the withdrawal of troops from the south-west portion of the province of Mukden, as far as the Liao River, was put into execution, but some, at least, of the troops thus nominally withdrawn appear to have remained on the line of the railway, within Manchuria.

During the negotiations between Russia and Japan, which immediately preceded the war, two infantry brigades,† with part of the divisional artillery, were moved from European Russia to Chita in Trans-Baikal; two additional East Siberian rifle brigades‡ were formed by drafts from Russia and from the fortress infantry of Vladivostok and Port Arthur, and an additional railway battalion was raised, which reached Liao-yang early in September. Further reinforcements were contemplated, and various units in Russia received orders to mobilize or to hold themselves in readiness to do so, before the end of 1903.

* Viz., in Manchuria, including the Kuan-tung District, 80 battalions, 62 squadrons, and 232 guns; and in the Pri-Amur Command, 26 battalions, 25 squadrons and 28 guns.

† i.e., 2nd Brigades of the 31st and 35th Infantry Divisions, belonging to the Xth and XVIIth Army Corps respectively, each with 3 artillery batteries.

‡ i.e., 7th and 8th.

These various movements and new formations, coupled with uncertainty as to when the troops became actually available in the Far East, make it difficult to estimate with even approximate exactitude, the Russian forces in the neighbourhood of the theatre of war at the outbreak of hostilities. In the absence of any authoritative official *data*, the only sound basis upon which to found calculations is the number and established strength of the units known to have been in the Far East, *i.e.*, to the east of Lake Baikal.

On this basis a table* has been compiled which shows in detail the number and combatant strength of the units composing the Russian forces in the Far East, at the beginning of February, 1904. In common with the rest of the Russian army, the troops are grouped or classified as field troops, which normally form the first line available for field operations, and fortress troops specially organized for service in the fortress to which they are allotted, with certain additional units employed in the construction and working of the railway, and the special force of all three arms guarding the railway line, the so-called Frontier Guards. The strength of these various classes of troops, based upon the establishments laid down, may be summarized as follows:—

Field troops:—			Combatants.
Infantry.	(96 battalions)	92,000
Cavalry.	(35 squadrons)	5,100
Artillery.	(25 batteries=196 guns.)	6,400
Engineers.	(13 companies)	2,700
Total Field troops			106,200
Fortress troops (26 companies)			7,700
Railway troops			11,450
Frontier Guards (55 companies infantry, 55 squadrons, 6 batteries=48 guns)			23,450
Total combatant strength			148,800 men.

with some 240 horse, field, and mountain guns, and 8 machine guns.

If the non-combatants, forming an integral part of such a force, amounting to some 16,500 men, be added to the above combatants, a total of about 165,000 men is reached. Again, if certain additional troops reported to have been despatched early in February, as well as the possible arrival in Manchuria of unknown reinforcements from Siberia, be taken into account, the grand total of the Russian military forces may have amounted to some 175,000 men all told, though this appears improbable.

No official or detailed statement of the Russian troops within the theatre of war at this period has yet been published, and until such appears estimates must necessarily take its place. These may be accurate or the reverse, but there is every reason to believe that Russian military preparations were far from having reached completion at the outbreak of hostilities, and that units were

* See Appendix A.

considerably below their regulation war establishment. It may be taken for granted therefore that the force as indicated in the estimate above, did not attain its full strength till some time after war broke out. It is believed that, at the commencement of the campaign, the fighting strength of battalions did not exceed seven hundred bayonets,* and that a squadron represented only about one hundred sabres. Calculated on this basis the field troops would amount only to some 67,200 bayonets and 3,500 sabres, and even assuming that the artillery and engineers were not subject to the same shortage of men, the total of the field troops would amount to some 80,000 men only, or about 26,000 men less than the total of the field troops given above and in Appendix A. A similar shortage of men no doubt existed in the other troops enumerated, but in the absence of definite data nothing is to be gained by pursuing the subject further.

Whatever the actual total of troops may have been, it must not be forgotten that they were scattered over the vast area stretching from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok and from Port Arthur to Nikolaievsk; a large proportion of the force, therefore, cannot be considered as having been actually available for operations in the field at the opening of the campaign.

If, as has been already pointed out, there is difficulty in arriving at anything more than an approximate estimate of the numbers of Russian troops in the Far East, a similar and perhaps greater difficulty is met with in attempting to ascertain their actual distribution. For obvious reasons every effort would be made by the Russian Staff to conceal the actual disposition of the troops available, and this disposition has not yet been officially divulged. This difficulty is augmented by the fact that though an organization of four Army Corps was officially adopted at the outset of the war, it was soon after, for all practical purposes, abandoned by General Kuropatkin, and the troops were formed into armies and mixed columns or detachments, as circumstances required.

In general terms the bulk of the Russian forces available was massed in two main groups, in the neighbourhood of Vladivostok and Port Arthur respectively; a third and much smaller group stood on the railway between Harbin and Liao-yang, towards the latter of which places concentration was in progress. The remaining troops were further north and in Trans-Baikalia, engaged in making their way to the theatre of operations, and in some cases were still in process of formation.

The disposition of the field troops, as far as can be ascertained at present, was approximately as follows:—

- (a) *In the Ussuri District, near Vladivostok:* Four East Siberian Rifle Brigades,† two European Infantry Brigades, two regiments of cavalry, one sapper battalion, and

* It appears that in the early actions of the campaign, rifle battalions were approximately only 700 bayonets strong.

† Including the 8th brigade which had only recently been formed from Fortress Infantry at Vladivostok.

fourteen batteries; in all, 48 battalions of infantry, 12 squadrons of cavalry, 4 companies of engineers, and about 112 guns.

- (b) *In the Kuan-tung Peninsula, and Southern Manchuria:* Three East Siberian Rifle Brigades,* one Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade, two sapper battalions, and five batteries; in all, 30 battalions of infantry, 12 squadrons of cavalry, 8 companies of engineers, and 40 guns.

(The above are in addition to the fortress and technical troops allotted to Vladivostok and Port Arthur respectively, enumerated in detail in Appendix A.)

- (c) *On or near the railway, south of Harbin:* One East Siberian Rifle Brigade, one cavalry brigade, and two batteries; in all, 8 battalions of infantry, 11 squadrons of cavalry, and 12 guns.

It appears, therefore, that excluding the Frontier Guards protecting the railway, the units still in Trans-Baikal and Northern Manchuria, and the technical, railway, and fortress troops, there were available for operations in the field at the beginning of February only some 86 battalions,† 35 squadrons, and 164 guns. Assuming the actual fighting strength of battalions and squadrons to have been approximately seven hundred bayonets and one hundred sabres respectively, the force available for immediate operations could hardly have exceeded 60,000 bayonets, 3,500 sabres, and about 164 guns.

The Russian Navy, like the Army, is recruited by conscription. The term of service is ten years, of which, as a rule, seven years are passed in actual service and three in the first reserve.‡ On the expiry of the latter term men are transferred to the second reserve to which they belong until the age of forty-three is reached.

At the outbreak of the war with Japan, Russia had, in all, nineteen first-class and six second-class battleships, ten armoured coast defence vessels, twenty first-class and eight other cruisers, thirty-seven destroyers, seventy-seven first-class and ninety-eight second-class torpedo boats and a large number of minor vessels of war.

As in the case of the land forces, the Russian fleet in the Pacific had been, by degrees, greatly augmented since the occupation of Port Arthur in 1898, and by the end of 1903 its strength was not far short of double what it had been in the

* Including the 7th brigade which had only recently been formed, from Fortress Infantry at Port Arthur.

† Of these, 20 battalions belonged to the 7th and 8th East Siberian Rifle Brigades. Though the recent alteration in their nomenclature and organization would seem to indicate an intention to convert them into field troops, they cannot be so considered in the fullest sense. These troops did not actually form part of the field armies, but remained at their respective fortresses. If these battalions be excluded the strength of infantry available for field operations at this time would be some 46,000 rifles only.

‡ Since the conclusion of the war with Japan, service in the navy has been altered to 5 years' active and 5 years' reserve service.

previous year. Its strength would have been even greater had not the outbreak of war compelled Admiral Virenius's Mediterranean division to put back.

Immediately before hostilities began the ships available in Far Eastern waters were seven first-class battleships, nine first-class and two second-class cruisers, four gunboats, six sloops, twenty-five destroyers, two mining transports and some fourteen first-class torpedo boats.

These forces suffered from the disadvantage of being divided. Seven battleships and six cruisers were at Port Arthur; four cruisers were at Vladivostok, and one cruiser was at Chemulpo in Korea.

THE NAVAL FORCES OF RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST.

Name and classification...	Displacement.	I.H.P.	Measured mile speed.	Gun protection.	Armament.
	Tons.		Knots.	Inches.	
BATTLESHIPS.					
<i>First Class.</i>					
*Sevastopol ...	10,960	10,600	17.5	14	4 12-in., 12 6-in., and 38 smaller guns.
*Petropavlovsk ...	10,960	11,213	16.8	14	Ditto. ditto.
*Poltava ...	10,960	11,255	16.3	14	Ditto. ditto.
*Peresviet ...	12,674	14,533	18.5	9	4 10-in., 11 6-in., 20 3-in., and 24 smaller guns.
*Pobieda...	12,674	14,500	18.0	9	Ditto. ditto.
*Retvizan ...	12,700	17,000	18.0	10	4 12-in., 12 6-in., 20 3-in., and 28 smaller guns.
*Tsarevitch ...	12,900	16,000	18.0	11	Ditto. ditto.
CRUISERS.					
<i>First Class.</i>					
†Rurik ...	10,933	13,250	18.7	3½	4 8-in., 16 6-in., 6 4.7-in., and 18 smaller guns.
†Rossia ...	12,200	17,000	20.2	3	4 8-in., 16 6-in., 12 3-in., and 38 smaller guns.
†Gromoboi ...	12,364	15,496	20.0	5	4 8-in., 16 6-in., 24 3-in., and 8 smaller guns.
*Bayan ...	7,800	16,500	21.0	6.7	2 8-in., 8 6-in., 20 3-in., and 7 smaller guns.
*Diana ...	6,630	11,610	20.0	—	8 6-in., 24 3-in., and 10 smaller guns.
*Pallada...	6,630	11,610	20.0	—	Ditto. ditto.
†Variag ...	6,500	20,000	23.6	—	12 6-in., 12 3-in., and 10 smaller guns.
†Bogatir...	6,720	20,000	23.0	5	12 6-in., 12 3-in., and 9 smaller guns.
*Askold ...	6,000	19,000	23.0	—	12 6-in., 12 3-in., and 12 smaller guns.
<i>Second Class.</i>					
*Novik ...	3,000	17,000	25.0	—	6 4.7-in., and 9 smaller guns.
*Boyarín...	3,000	11,500	23.0	—	6 4.7-in., and 14 smaller guns.

In addition to the above, there were 4 gunboats, 6 sloops, 25 destroyers, and some 14 first-class torpedo boats divided between Port Arthur and Vladivostok.

* At Port Arthur.

† At Vladivostok.

‡ At Chemulpo.

CHAPTER IV.

THE THEATRE OF WAR AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

THE theatre of war, the scene of the struggle between Russia and Japan, may be divided into three sections, the Sea, Korea and Manchuria.

Of these the first and most extensive area was formed by the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, two bodies of water linked together by the Straits of Korea. The former lies east of the peninsula of Korea, and from it the Pacific may be reached by several avenues. Two of these, the most important, have been already mentioned and when war broke out they were practically under Japanese control; but a third way, free from ice throughout the year, leads to the ocean through the Straits of La Pérouse between the islands of Saghalien and Hokkaido. Between the western coast-line of Korea and the Shan-tung Province of the Chinese Empire lies the Yellow Sea, at whose north-west extremity are the Gulfs of Pei-chih-li and of Liao-tung. To reach this portion of the sea the Straits of Pei-chih-li some sixty miles in width running between the Liao-tung Peninsula and a protuberance of the Shan-tung Province must be traversed. On the northern coast of the Gulf of Liao-tung is the port of Newchwang (Ying-kou), which is closed for some months of the year by ice. It is situated on the left bank of the Liao Ho, about thirteen miles from its mouth.

Thrust out from the province of Manchuria and stretching southwards towards Japan is the peninsula of Korea. With a mean breadth of one hundred and fifty miles, it varies in length from four hundred to six hundred miles, and has an area approximately equal to that of England and Scotland together. The peninsula is generally mountainous and has been described as being "as plentifully sprinkled with mountains as a ploughed field with ridges," but despite this fact Korea is a purely agricultural country. It possess many excellent ports, more especially on the southern and western coasts, while on the east the only harbour of value is that of Gensan or Yuen-san. Situated on the Korean Straits is Masampo, a splendid landlocked port, and forty miles east of it is the Japanese settlement of Fusan where the railway* to Seoul has its southern terminus.

Not far from the south-western extremity of the peninsula is Mokpo and further north are the harbours of Chemulpo and Chinampo. The former, which is the port of the capital, Seoul,

* This railway was completed in January, 1904.

and is connected with it by a single line of railway twenty-six miles in length, lies at the entrance to the Salie River. This harbour is not frozen over in winter, but in January and February there is enough ice to prevent the working of cargo, and to make the work of loading or unloading vessels difficult for a month before and after the period indicated. North of Chemulpo is Chinampo on the right bank of the Tatong River and about twenty miles from its mouth, while some forty miles further up that river is the important town of Pingyang with 35,000 inhabitants. Chinampo is closed for at least two months annually by ice.

The roads, or rather unmetalled tracks through the interior of the country, are of varying width and are generally steep and stony. During dry weather, cavalry, infantry, and mountain artillery can move freely, but in wet weather, or when the ground is thawing, movements are extremely difficult.

To the north-east of Korea lies the Russian Maritime Province, and across the frontier line formed by the Ya-lu and Tumen Rivers, which flow in opposite directions, is Manchuria.

The province of that name which is called by the Chinese, the Tung-san-sheng or "Three Eastern Provinces," occupies the north-eastern corner of the Chinese Empire. The area of the three provinces is some 366,000 square miles, but that of

Feng-tien and Kirin, the actual scene of the operations which took place in Manchuria, is only 161,000 square miles, or slightly greater than the area of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony combined.

Within the province of Feng-tien, in the space between the Ya-lu and Liao Rivers is a confused mass of mountains, whose main ridge stretches in one direction to the extremity of the Liao-tung Peninsula, and in the other far into the Primorsk or Maritime Province north of Vladivostok. In the neighbourhood of Hai-cheng and Liao-yang the range is known from its picturesquely pointed nature as the Chien Shan or Thousand Peaks. Several roads cross it, of which the most important is the Imperial Peking highway leading from Korea to the Chinese capital by way of Liao-yang. This road traverses the mountain chain by the Mo-tien Ling (the Heaven-reaching Pass) which is 4,000 feet in height. Further towards the south-west, where the range is lower, there are several roads, notably those from Hsiu-yen and Feng-huang-cheng, to Hsi-mu-cheng and Hai-cheng, and still further in the same direction roads across the peninsula become numerous. The hills are for the most part wooded, more especially in the higher regions, and the roads across the main ridge are mere cart tracks, steep and narrow, making the passage of large bodies of troops and transport a slow and arduous affair.

Besides the hilly region just described, a large area of the theatre of operations is occupied by the valley, or as it might more correctly be termed the plain, of the Liao Ho, where immense crops of millet and beans are grown. This millet or *kao-liang* (tall grain) is planted in drills two feet apart and soon after it has sprouted the crop is thinned so that each plant remains about eighteen inches from the next. During the rains it quickly

grows to between twelve and fifteen feet in height, thus obscuring the view and serving as a screen for troops. By breaking the stalks some three feet from the ground an obstacle difficult of passage can be formed.

The river by which this fertile area is watered enters Manchuria from Mongolia after a course of three hundred and fifty miles and flows into the sea near Newchwang. On its way south several tributaries join it from the east, and of these the Tai-tzu Ho, which flows past Liao-yang and the main stream, are both navigable at certain seasons for junks of varying size.

The climate of Manchuria is temperate in summer, but in winter is extremely cold. July and August are the hottest months, but the heat is not excessive. The rainy season generally occurs during these months, but occasionally the rains commence earlier and at times last into September. The rainfall, though not great throughout the year, amounting usually only to some thirteen inches, is at times so heavy as to inundate the country and cause damage to the railway. The snowfall is light, two or three snowstorms, on an average, occurring in the course of the winter, but the snow vapourizing under the warm sun does not lie for long upon the plains. The country is generally ice-bound from November to March, when the rivers, being frozen, are passable for heavy traffic. Roads in the European sense do not exist, being mere tracks through the soft soil, and after heavy rains or when the thaw begins become impassable. The lack of good means of communication limits the period during which military operations can be carried on to the dry season, for the cold in winter is so severe that troops are practically driven at that time to resort to quarters. These are to be found in the numerous villages which are scattered here and there wherever there is cultivation, but in the hilly districts and in the north where the population is sparse, they are few and far between.

To the west of Manchuria lies the neutral province of Mongolia, from which large quantities of cattle and ponies can be obtained.

To keep her army in the Far East supplied with troops and all the many requisites for waging war, Russia was restricted to the Communica- Trans-Siberian Railway and its extension from the tions.

Manchurian frontier by Harbin to the south. The great length of this line of communication from Moscow to the extremity of the Liao-tung Peninsula, amounting almost to 5,500 miles, and the fact that a gap occurred in it at Lake Baikal (which was not destined to be completed by a line round its southern shore for several months), were factors which had an important bearing throughout the war and more especially during its earlier phases. On the other hand, Japan, as soon as sea command was gained, could land her troops at almost any point on the seaboard of the theatre of war, and until that time arrived, the southern ports of Korea, close to her own, were practically safe from the risk of Russian naval intervention.

The mercantile marine of Japan had risen from 167,000 gross tonnage, in 1893, to 656,745 at the outbreak of the war, and these figures included many fine and fast steamers exceeding 5,000

tons burthen. Her strategic position, too, was well suited for the assembly of a large fleet of transports, for her coast-line is studded with fine harbours connected with the garrisons in the interior of the country by rail, while the Inland Sea forms a practically safe line of communication as far as the western extremity of the main island. From that point across the straits to Masampo on the southern coast of Korea is about one hundred and twenty miles, while the distance by sea from that port to either Vladivostok or Port Arthur is only a little more than five hundred miles.

CHAPTER V.

THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES.

ALTHOUGH Japan did not sever diplomatic relations with Russia until the 6th February, it had been evident to her, for some time prior to that date, that little prospect of a peaceful settlement remained. The only termination of her patient efforts to negotiate seemed to lie in an appeal to arms, and for such a serious issue she was well prepared.

Long before the rupture, her plan of action had been carefully thought out, and a wise division of her limited resources had brought both Army and Navy to such a footing, that, when the crisis came, it lay within her power to strike on sea and land without delay. Her naval strength, if slightly inferior on paper to the Russian fleet in Far Eastern waters, was more than a match for it by reason of efficiency. Her Army, once sea command secured, could reach the field of operations in force superior to the Russian troops already there, and be maintained in greater numbers than those the Trans-Siberian Railway could convey. The whole issue of the coming struggle, if the question of finance be excluded, evidently hung on sea supremacy; but it was clear that no fleet, however powerful, could of itself expel the Russians from Manchuria. To that end the possession of an adequate land force was essential, but, despite her care and calculation, Japan failed to estimate correctly what its strength should be. The enemy's numbers in the field and power of adding to them, his preparations, armament, and general efficiency had all been searchingly examined; no efforts had been spared, no means neglected, to ensure a just appreciation of all the struggle would demand; yet, such is the difficulty of forecasting with exactitude an adversary's strength, that Japan found herself, in the first year of the war, obliged not only to modify her military law in order to recall reservists who had been passed to the National Army, but forced to augment the permanent establishment of her military forces by four additional divisions. With a military system less elastic than that she actually possessed, or ill-fitted for the rapid training of both officers and men, her situation in Manchuria would have been precarious.

As pointed out above, the leading object of the Japanese was to obtain command of the sea, and at the beginning of February the fleet was concentrated at Sasebo. The Russian naval strength was known to be divided. At Port Arthur, under Admiral Starck, was the main portion of the fleet, at Vladivostok were four cruisers, and at Chemulpo, in Korea, were the cruiser *Variag*, the gunboat *Koreetz*, and the *Sungari*, a transport ship.

On the 3rd February, when the details of a projected attack

on the Russian vessels in Chemulpo were under consideration, a report reached Tokio that the Russian squadron at Port Arthur had put to sea. For a brief space something akin to consternation filled the breasts of the Japanese, and ships and forts were ordered to be ready for eventualities; but the alarm, if it deserves the name, quickly subsided when it was known that the Russian admiral had anchored his command in the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. This incident was not without effect. On the 4th, the Grand Council met at Tokio under the presidency of the Emperor and, after long deliberation, resolved forthwith to terminate relations with St. Petersburg. On the evening of that day it was decided to despatch a naval squadron to Chemulpo and another to Port Arthur, but, as regards the Army, orders for its mobilization were purposely withheld. It was important both strategically and politically that the Japanese should occupy Seoul, but, if word reached the Russians, who were known to have troops on board their vessels at Chemulpo, that mobilization had been ordered, the knowledge might precipitate a movement on the Korean capital. In addition, moreover, to the risk of being forestalled by the Russians in that direction, there was a danger of aggression from the north, where a Cossack regiment of six squadrons, stationed at Feng-huang-cheng, had already pushed patrols south of the Ya-lu River to reconnoitre.

The situation at this time was somewhat critical for the Japanese, and a false move might easily have upset their plans. If the Russians could be anticipated in Korea, not only would Admiral Starck find it difficult, if not impossible, to secure a port in the south from which to operate against Japan, but the harbours on its western coast would be available as bases for Admiral Togo's fleet. But there was still another great advantage to be gained by a timely occupation of the peninsula. From Wiju on the Ya-lu to Fusan on the Korean Straits its length is some four hundred miles, and by laying hands on the capital and pressing quickly towards the Ya-lu, the northern ports might be secured for disembarking troops, and a long and toilsome march to the Manchurian frontier avoided.

Rapidity of action was imperative, and, as mobilized troops could not be sent to occupy Seoul, four battalions,* at peace strength, from the 12th Division were chosen for that service. The order for their movement reached them at 6 p.m. on the 5th February, and by 2 a.m. on the 6th, they were embarking at Sasebo. Three transports lying there in readiness were employed, two of which took the troops, numbering in all about 2,500 men, while the third vessel carried a temporary wharf, some boats, steam launches and other gear necessary to effect a rapid landing on the coast.

At 2 p.m. the convoy left Sasebo, escorted by a division of the fleet under Rear-Admiral Uriu, consisting of seven cruisers and

* Two battalions from Kokura, one battalion from Fukuoka, and one from Omura. All these places are in the island of Kiushu, in which the naval base Sasebo is situated. It is not known which battalions of the 12th Division were sent, but it is probable that they belonged to the 23rd Brigade, of which Major-General Kigoshi was the commander.

twelve torpedo boats, and proceeded to Hako in the Naju group of islands, a temporary advanced base some twelve miles west of Mokpo harbour in Korea. Thence the course was laid to Asan, at the head of an inlet of the sea, situated some twelve miles to the south of Chemulpo. Meanwhile the main body of the fleet, under Admiral Togo, had sailed towards Port Arthur after detaching a squadron to guard the Korean Straits.

On the 7th February communication by telegraph cable between Chemulpo and Port Arthur had been interrupted, and at midnight on that date a Japanese second-class cruiser, which was lying at the former place, quietly weighed anchor and proceeded out of port. Next afternoon the Russian gunboat *Koreetz* also left the harbour, but before she had proceeded far, she encountered three torpedo boats, the scouts of Rear-Admiral Uriu's command. The gunboat fired upon them and they replied with torpedoes, on which she steamed back to her anchorage. At 5.15 p.m. the Japanese cruisers and their convoy appeared and an hour later the

troops began to disembark. By 3 a.m. on the 9th the
 The Japanese four battalions, under command of Major-General
 land at Kigoshi, were on shore, and two of them were sent
 Chemulpo. by rail to occupy Seoul.

There as on all occasions during the campaign, the arrival of the Japanese was at once followed by the seizure of the telegraph offices, a precaution necessary to prevent the transmission of unauthorized information. The disembarkation, except for the action of the *Koreetz*, had been effected without opposition, for the commander of the Russian ships was unaware that a state of war existed. At 6 a.m. on the 9th the Japanese cruisers left the harbour, and at 8 a.m. Rear-Admiral Uriu sent a formal demand to the naval officer in command of the Russian warships to put to sea before noon, adding that in case of a refusal he would attack them in port.

About 11.30 a.m. the *Variag* and *Koreetz* steamed out gallantly to meet their fate. An engagement took place about six miles from port, lasting, from the first shot fired to the last, but fourteen minutes, in which the *Variag* was severely damaged, though the *Koreetz*, to which the Japanese paid no attention, did not suffer. Both Russian ships returned to port together with the transport *Sungari* and were sunk or blown up by their crews, who were taken on board neutral men-of-war, then at Chemulpo.

Meanwhile events of greater moment had occurred elsewhere. By 6 p.m. on the 8th the two divisions of the fleet under Admiral
 The attack Togo, consisting of six battleships, six first and four
 upon the second-class cruisers, two despatch boats and eighteen
 Russian fleet at destroyers were lying off Round Island, about sixty
 Port Arthur. miles east of Port Arthur. At 6.30 p.m. eleven des-
 troyers in three divisions left for the Russian naval base, the
 remaining eight vessels of that type making for Ta-lien-wan. The
 latter found no ships within the bay, and returned without effecting
 anything. About 10.30 p.m. the flotilla directed on Port Arthur
 met two Russian torpedo boats, and passed them in the dark,
 apparently unnoticed. At 12.15 a.m. the lights of the fortress

came in view and, shortly afterwards, an attack was delivered on the Russian battleships and cruisers lying at anchor in the outer roadstead. The enemy was taken by surprise and, in a few minutes, the *Retvizan*, *Tsarevitch*, and *Pallada* were struck and damaged by torpedoes. The destroyers then drew off and, at noon on the 9th, the Japanese fleet came up and attacked the enemy still at anchor near the entrance to Port Arthur. In this action four Russian battleships or cruisers suffered injury, and though the Japanese vessels received some damage, it was slight and very soon repaired.* After carrying out these operations, the success of which was greatly due to the secrecy maintained regarding plans and preparations, and the position of the temporary naval base, Admiral Togo assembled his fleet at Asan Bay.

Not content, however, with his achievements, he ordered another attack to be made on the Port Arthur squadron by destroyers. This was carried out with less success than on the previous occasion, for the night of the 14th February, on which it took place, was dark and stormy and snow was falling heavily. Two only out of eight destroyers found a vessel to attack, but these succeeded in damaging with torpedoes a third-class cruiser. Three days earlier another mishap had befallen the Russians, when the mine-laying vessel *Yenisei* struck a mine and foundered, losing ninety-six of her crew.

News of the activity of the Japanese in the Yellow Sea had meantime come to Vladivostok. On the 9th February, the four cruisers there and a transport had put to sea, and, on the 14th, while cruising in the vicinity of Hakodate on the Tsugaru Straits, they sank a small coasting steamer.

To revert again to the military operations. At 2 p.m. on the 6th February, orders to mobilize were issued to the Guard, 2nd and 12th Divisions, and to the fortresses of Tsushima and Hakodate; other forts being merely warned to be in readiness against attack. It had been originally intended to land the 12th Division at Fusan, distant eighteen days' march from the Korean capital, and on that line posts with food and other necessities for the troops had been prepared, but the successes gained by the naval squadrons had changed the general situation, and it was undesirable to delay an hour in getting reinforcements to Seoul. It was decided therefore to continue to utilize Chemulpo as a landing place, and the necessary transports for the troops who were to proceed there were ordered to equip at Ujina on the Inland Sea and thence repair to Nagasaki. By the 14th February, the 12th Division had finished mobilizing and was brought by rail to Nagasaki, where it embarked in six groups. The first of these sailed at noon on the 15th, and, on the morning of the 17th, landed at Chemulpo, and by the 21st the whole division had completed its disembarkation at that port. In order that the time of arrival at its destination might be calculated with precision, each transport touched at the

* At Chemulpo and Port Arthur the Russians lost 60 killed and 128 wounded, while the Japanese had no casualties at the former place, but had 6 killed and 43 wounded at Port Arthur.

temporary naval base at Hako, which was connected by telegraph cable with Chemulpo and Sasebo. Besides the 12th Division, two regiments, the 37th and 38th, of the 4th Division, landed at Chemulpo and thence went to Seoul, while Fusan, Masampo and Gensan were all garrisoned by Japanese troops.

So far the Japanese land operations had progressed beyond anticipation. Thanks to sea power and the prompt despatch of troops, Chemulpo had been secured as a landing place, and the occupation of Seoul had been effected without opposition. These successes had saved the 12th Division the long march from Fusan to the capital, and, for the benefit of the troops that soon would follow from Japan, an experiment somewhat similar might be repeated further north. But not immediately, for the river at Chinampo was still frozen and that place therefore unfit for the present as a port of disembarkation. As a preliminary step, however, Pingyang, the most important town in North Korea, lying one hundred and fifty miles, or twelve days' march, north of Seoul, had been already garrisoned. On the 21st February a party of twenty Japanese infantry with a commissariat officer arrived there, and drove off a small body of Cossacks who attempted to enter the town. The infantry had been detached from a company which, together with stores, had been landed at Haiju, north of Chemulpo, with the object of establishing a subsidiary base, when the troops first disembarked at the latter place. As, however, there were no supplies between Seoul and Pingyang, another company of infantry with a commissariat officer was sent north from the capital, on the 15th, to prepare four line-of-communication posts. By means of this arrangement the cavalry of the 12th Division reached Pingyang from Seoul on the 23rd and assured the safety of the little garrison. On the 25th the leading infantry of the division arrived, and about the 18th March most of it was north of Pingyang, leaving that place vacant for the reception of other troops shortly to arrive. Anju had been occupied, on the 10th, by two squadrons of Japanese cavalry, which were joined next day by a battalion of infantry, and about a week later three more battalions came up to strengthen the outpost line on the Chechen River, which at this time served as boundary between the Russians and the Japanese.

Meanwhile mobilization had been proceeding steadily in Japan, and by the 4th March,* the Guard and 2nd Divisions were concentrated at Hiroshima in readiness to embark. On what part of the Korean coast to land these troops was now the question? From the direction of Port Arthur, which was carefully watched by Admiral Togo's fleet, there was little chance of interruption, and the sea at the mouth of the Taitong River, where the port of Chinampo is situated, though still reported to

* One Japanese authority states that the transport by sea of the Guard and 2nd Divisions began on 1st March. Another and higher authority states that these divisions were concentrated at Hiroshima on the 4th March. A later statement of the Japanese General Staff gives the date of the concentration at Hiroshima as the 9th March. Both divisions are stated to have begun moving by rail to that place on the 15th February.

be frozen, would in a few days be clear of ice. From that point, Pingyang—in occupation of the 12th Division—distant forty miles, could readily be reached, and the march thither from Chemulpo through Seoul avoided. On the 8th an attempt to disembark, made by a small party sent to build piers at Chinampo, failed, though the ice was then melting fast; but on the 10th another effort won success, and the news was telegraphed to Ujina.*

At this time General Kuroki, who had been appointed to command the First Japanese Army, was at Hiroshima and had received information that the enemy was concentrating near Liaoyang and Feng-huang-cheng, and that a small detachment of the 12th Division, as already mentioned, had occupied Pingyang, where the whole of that division would arrive by about the middle of March. Chinampo had been selected by the military authorities at Tokio as the point of disembarkation for the remainder of his Army, but as the arrangements in Korea devolved upon him, he decided to take measures lest the 12th Division, whose duty it was to cover the landing, should fail to reach Pingyang in time. The roads, too, from Chinampo to that place and along the coast northward were known to be bad, and would require repairs before troops, guns, and transport could move, and telegraphic communication was also necessary from the landing place to the headquarters of the 12th Division.

General Kuroki therefore detailed an advanced force, consisting of the cavalry of the Guard and 2nd Divisions (six squadrons), a regiment of infantry, two battalions of engineers, and two telegraph companies, which landed at Chinampo on the 13th March. Of this force, the cavalry, one battalion of infantry and one of engineers marched direct to Anju. That place was reached on the 18th, and the new arrivals raised the total force in its vicinity to eight squadrons of cavalry, five battalions of infantry and one battalion of engineers. Immediately after the advanced force came the Guards and 2nd Division, despatched in four groups from Ujina. The first group sailed on the 14th and by the 29th the whole force had landed in Korea.

As fighting was expected in the Anju valley it was important that the Army should be kept concentrated, but, at the same time, for purposes of quartering some dispersion of the troops was unavoidable. To reconcile these two requirements serviceable roads were indispensable, but those repaired by the engineers became so bad when, soon after the middle of March, the thaw began, that marches sometimes averaged less than five miles a day. Guns, carriages, and transport carts sank to the axles in the mud, and men and horses floundered through with difficulty. Such adverse circumstances made the question of supply acute. For a time, however, this was overcome by employing as carriers 10,000 Korean coolies.

On the 17th General Kuroki and his staff reached Chinampo, where he was informed by a staff officer who had preceded him, that with the exception of some 1,500 to 2,000 of the enemy's

* Ujina on the Inland Sea is the port of Hiroshima from which it is about three and a half miles distant. Ujina was the principal base in Japan during the war.

cavalry on the left bank of the Ya-lu,* between Paksan and Wiju, there were no hostile forces near. The weakness of the enemy now led General Kuroki to decide that it was unnecessary to await the concentration of his Army† south and south-east of Anju, before undertaking measures which would facilitate his eventual northward advance. Something in that direction might be begun at once and, with this view, he ordered the two rivers north of Anju, the Chechen and the Taing, to be bridged. To cover this work a force was detailed from Anju, consisting of seven squadrons of cavalry, two batteries of mountain artillery and five battalions of infantry.‡ On the 25th, Paksan and Kasan were occupied, the enemy falling back upon the roads leading to Wiju and Unsan. By the 27th, a pontoon bridge was thrown over the Taing and one of local materials was built across the Chechen River.

The difficulty of feeding the covering force and at the same time of collecting provisions at Anju for the advance of the Army again gave prominence to the supply question, but the proximity of the sea offered a solution. A reconnaissance of the roads had shown that the main road, which is the nearest to the coast, was the only one in any way fit for the movement of a large body of troops. There were two other roads running parallel to it, but, even if they had been otherwise suitable, no lateral communication existed between them and the coast road, while the front of the Army, if all three were used, would be no less than forty-four miles. That the bulk of the Army must follow the coast road was inevitable, while to guard the right flank a detachment must be sent along the third road which is furthest from the sea.

To protect the necessary bases on the coast and inland depôts, a detachment was formed to act as the advanced guard of the army. This force was taken from the covering troops north of Anju, and owing to difficulties of supply had to be made as small as was compatible with safety. Its constitution was five squadrons of cavalry, two batteries of mountain artillery, three battalions of infantry and one company of engineers. It was to advance as soon as sufficient supplies for it could be collected at Anju, but until they could be brought by boat up the Chechen River no movement was possible. While these arrangements were in progress, the Guard Cavalry with a small force of infantry engaged some six hundred Russian cavalry south of Tiessu on the 28th March, and occupied that place with a loss of five killed and twelve wounded. By the 31st, supplies brought from Chinampo to the river's mouth, were coming into Anju in Korean boats, and on the 1st April the advanced guard moved forward.

* See Map II.

† The 12th Division did not at first form part of the First Army, but was placed under General Kuroki's orders on the 17th March, when he landed at Chinampo.

‡ 1st Guard Regiment, two battalions, 14th Regiment (12th Division), two mountain batteries (12th Division), the bulk of the cavalry of the Guard and 12th Divisions, one company, Guard Engineers. The whole was under command of Major-General Asada.

Combined naval and military reconnaissances, made after the ice along the coast began to melt, had disclosed the best landing points for stores, and eventually five bases on the sea and as many depôts inland, all lying between the Chechen and Ya-lu Rivers were used. The most important of these bases was Rikaho, to cover which Chyaryonkoan was held, and by the 7th April sufficient supplies were landed to allow the Army to advance. To protect its right, a flank guard, consisting of one squadron of cavalry, two batteries of mountain artillery, and three battalions of infantry held Yongpyon, with orders to remain there till the main Army had left Anju, and then march to Siojo* on the Ya-lu.

On the 4th April, the 12th Division had marched to a point between Tiessu and Anju so as to be in a position to support the advanced guard, whose cavalry entered Wiju and Yongampo on that date, and on the 7th and 11th the Guard and 2nd Divisions followed. The Guard advanced in two columns, with one day's march between each column, following at two days' interval the 12th Division, which was similarly arranged, and three days' march after the Guard came the 2nd Division.

On the 8th and 9th, a violent storm of rain and wind raged and, on the latter date, the bridge over the Taing River was swept away, separating the columns of the Guard. The bridge over the Chechen River barely escaped a similar fate, for its abutments were destroyed, and the centre portion was covered by two feet of rushing water. One-half of the Army was now completely cut off from the other, but, to prevent still further damage, engineers helped by infantry and transport drivers, worked all night up to their necks in ice-cold water, and by piling heavy stones on the Chechen bridge saved it from destruction.

Next day, the 10th, the water fell, but the pontoon company at Anju could not reach the Taing River till 3 p.m., by which time the bridge over the Chechen had been restored. By 7 a.m. on the 11th a pontoon bridge was thrown over the former river and communication between the two columns of the Guard was again restored. The delay in their march had not affected that of the 2nd Division which was following at three days' interval.

Besides the effect of the storm at these two rivers, much damage was done elsewhere. A bridge which had been made at Pingyang was swept away, the piers at Chinampo were broken, and all the newly finished telegraph lines thrown down in many places. Fortunately, however, amid so much to cause anxiety to General Kuroki, the landing stage at the sea-base at Rikaho stood fast and no vessels carrying supplies were lost.

On the 8th April, the advanced guard entered Wiju. On the morning of the 12th a company of infantry drove off an enterprising party of fifty Russians who tried to cross the Ya-lu near that town, and on the 21st

The Japanese
occupy Wiju.

* The flank guard, which was under the command of Major-General Sasaki, appears to have marched in the first place to Chyangsyong on the Ya-lu, and afterwards moved to Siojo.

the concentration of the main Army south of Wiju was complete, its lines of supply being established from Rikaho, Boto, and Quiempo.

The 12th Division was south-east of Wiju, the Guard behind that town, and to the south-west of it stood the 2nd Division. On the extreme right the flank guard had left Unsan on the 16th,* and reached Chyangsyong on the 20th April after a trying march over difficult passes where all stores had to be portaged.

From the date of the landing of the first troops of the Guard Division at Chinampo until the concentration of the First Army at Wiju, almost six weeks had elapsed, and in that time a distance amounting only to about one hundred and thirty miles had been covered. Nevertheless, when all the circumstances under which the advance was carried out are taken into consideration, it was far from slow. At first the climate rendered water carriage for supplies impossible, then, when that means became available, through the disappearance of the ice upon the sea coast and rivers, land communication, at any time bad in Korea, grew worse, and the three divisions of the Army found themselves limited to a single road. Movement under such conditions is necessarily slow, and would have been more so had the Russians offered serious opposition to the advance.

Leaving for the present the First Army concentrated south of the Ya-lu River, it is now necessary to glance at the general course of events elsewhere, and more especially at those operations in which the naval forces of Japan and Russia were concerned.

On the 10th February both countries had published formal declarations of war, and on the same date the Tsar had issued an Imperial Ukase ordering the mobilization of troops of the Siberian Military district, and to some extent those in the provinces of Perm, Viatka and of the Military District of Kazan, to be mobilized.

On the 12th, China, owing to the initiative of the United States, made a declaration of neutrality, and proclamations of a similar nature had been issued on the 9th and 11th by several of the great and lesser Powers.

On the 23rd February, an agreement was signed by Japan and Korea by which the former country guaranteed the independence and integrity of the latter, receiving in return permission to utilize certain places in Korea for military purposes. This agreement was followed a few days later by an intimation that Japan proposed to undertake the immediate construction of a railway from Seoul to Wiju, and on the 8th March some 3,000 Japanese engineers arrived in Korea to prosecute the work.

On the Russian side General Kuropatkin, regarded as one of the ablest soldiers in Europe, was already on his way to assume command of the military forces in Manchuria, having received that appointment on the 20th February. On the 16th of that month, Admiral Makarov, a distinguished naval commander, left Kronstadt on appointment to supersede Admiral Starck; and on the same

* A later Japanese authority gives this date as the 12th April.
(860)

date Admiral Alexeiev, the Viceroy of the Tsar in the Far East, proceeded from Port Arthur to Mukden where he shortly afterwards established his head-quarters. Up to that time Admiral Alexeiev had controlled diplomatic relations between Russia in East Asia and the neighbouring countries, and had held supreme command of the naval and military forces there, but the probable magnitude of the coming operations required that their conduct should be delegated to others.

On the 23rd, while the newly appointed naval Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Makarov, was on his way to Port Arthur, a gallant attempt was made by the Japanese fleet to block the entrance of that place with ballast-laden vessels, and so prevent the Russian fleet, the greater part of which had been withdrawn to the inner roadstead, from issuing at will. A week later Vice-Admiral Kamamura with seven cruisers was despatched to the vicinity of Vladivostok to try and bring to battle the four Russian vessels there. Information had been received that the latter vessels were engaged in operations connected with the land forces in that locality, but beyond bombarding the fortress at long range on the 7th March the Japanese squadron effected nothing.

On the 7th, too, Admiral Togo had put his fleet in motion and on the 10th, after an engagement between his destroyers and those of the Russians, bombarded Port Arthur. Thereafter the Japanese temporary naval base was shifted from Hako to a bay south of Haiju, in Korea, which brought it to a distance of about two hundred and forty miles from Port Arthur.

These operations of the Japanese Navy were undertaken in order to ensure that the Russian fleet should remain in harbour during the disembarkation of the main body of the First Army in Korea, which took place shortly after; and that they attained their object has been already shown. On the 22nd March the naval operations were resumed, on which date Port Arthur was subjected to a bombardment by two battleships from Pigeon Bay, and on the 27th a second attempt was made to block the entrance to the harbour. During the bombardment the enemy's ships gradually came out of harbour, as if inviting the Japanese to close and engage them under the fire of the forts. This procedure on their part, which was followed only after Admiral Makarov had assumed command on the 9th March, led Admiral Togo to conceive the idea of laying mechanical mines both east and west of the entrance to the harbour on the course over which the enemy's ships generally steamed. This plan was carried out on the night of the 12th April by a destroyer squadron, which joined the battle fleet before daybreak at a rendezvous a few miles from the port. At dawn the Japanese light cruiser division stood fairly close in to the entrance in order to lure the Russians across the minefield. It was thought that this might lead the latter, should they escape the hidden danger, to pursue until the Japanese battleships were discovered, when these might interpose between the Russians and their harbour and thus force on an action. The plan succeeded in some degree. The Russians came out and by good fortune escaped damage, but on perceiving the

Japanese battle squadron, put their helms a-starboard and made for the entrance of Port Arthur. But their return was less fortunate, for the *Petropavlovsk* struck a mine and capsized, carrying down with her Admiral Makarov and some six hundred sailors. About the time that she disappeared, a second battleship, the *Pobieda*, also struck a mine and was injured.

On the 15th, the bombardment of Port Arthur was repeated by the *Kasuga* and *Nisshin* from Pigeon Bay. For two hours fire was maintained by their guns, and the new forts at Lao-tieh Shan were silenced.

Ten days later an incident took place near Gensan. On the 22nd April, Vice-Admiral Kamamura had arrived at that place with a squadron of ten cruisers and other vessels which included two transports. On the 23rd, the squadron left for Vladivostok, and on the 25th, the transport *Kinshu Maru*, with a company of infantry on board, left the harbour apparently with the intention of landing troops at some point on the Korean coast. She was met, however, by three cruisers from Vladivostok which had evaded Admiral Kamamura's squadron, and was sunk by them. In this affair about one hundred men were killed or drowned and others, numbering some two hundred and fifty, were captured.

At this point the land operations again demand attention, and the First Japanese Army on the left bank of the Ya-lu River must be rejoined.

CHAPTER VI.

THE BATTLE OF THE YA-LU.

THE position taken up by Lieutenant-General Zasulich, the Russian commander, to oppose the passage of the Ya-lu by the Japanese, extended from a point some four miles to the west of An-tung, through Chiu-lien-cheng to a bend on the Ai River, a short distance beyond the Kuan-tien-chen road. Opposite the centre at Chiu-lien-cheng the valley measures from three to four miles in width, and consists of a sandy plain broken up into many islands by the maze-like branches of the Ya-lu River and its tributary the Ai Ho. The ground in the valley is open and there is no cover except behind the patches of low trees and scrub which grow on the islands of Kintei and Oseki, or under the banks of the several channels of the river. That it was not intended to offer a very obstinate resistance to the crossing seems probable from the fact that the position covered a front of some twenty miles, and that the high ground at the confluence of the rivers north of Wiju was merely held by an outpost. At that point is a rocky height, called Tiger Hill, half a mile in length and five hundred feet high, which has the appearance of an isolated feature rising from the river bed, though in reality it is an offshoot from higher ground to the north, with which it is connected by a col or neck. Posted on this hill, artillery, up to the limit of its range, could frustrate any attempt to cross the valley except by night, while the same locality, if in the hands of the Japanese, would serve as a pivot from which to operate against either flank or the centre of the Russian position. Of this position only the portion which extends from Chiu-lien-cheng to the extreme left was to be subjected to attack. Its nature is as follows:—

From Chiu-lien-cheng northward spurs are thrown out towards the river from the high ground in rear. These drop steeply till they meet the valley, and the majority terminate in knolls varying from one hundred and fifty to two hundred feet in height. At the foot of these spurs were infantry entrenchments placed with a command of about twenty feet over the sandy plain in front. These works, which might easily have been made almost invisible by utilizing broken ground, were conspicuous at a distance to the naked eye, and consisted of breastworks revetted with boughs, with a trench in rear. Epaulments for twelve guns had been prepared on the high ground west of Chiu-lien-cheng, but like

* See Maps II, and III,

the infantry defences they were not concealed and moreover lacked solidity. Lateral communications were difficult, and for guns were only possible along indifferent tracks, while the line of retreat was limited to a single road.*

The main strength of the position lay in its extensive field of fire, and the obstacles afforded by the rivers in front of it, which served to some extent the same purpose as the wet ditches of a fortress. Of these rivers the Ai, which could be generally crossed by wading at a depth of four or five feet, was ninety yards in breadth and ran at a distance varying from three hundred to eight hundred yards from the Russian trenches. The Ya-lu flowed in two streams, both of which were unfordable. Of these the southern channel averaged two hundred and thirty yards in breadth and the main stream three hundred and eighty yards.

The Japanese who had crossed the Ya-lu in face of the Chinese in 1894, were fully cognizant of the difficulties which they would have to overcome. Ten days were available after they reached the neighbourhood of Wiju, in which to make preparations, and during that period the point of passage had to be hidden from the Russian general in order that he might continue to maintain the wide front taken up by his troops. This could only be accomplished by making feints at many points and utilizing every artifice that ingenuity could devise. Concealment of strength was of the first importance, and to effect this, the advanced guard, as it approached Wiju, had erected screens of *kao-liang* and trees along the road, where it passes over high ground south of the town. This precaution was necessary, because parts of that road were exposed to view from the right bank of the Ya-lu, and troops and guns as they moved along it, could have been counted. On arriving near the Ya-lu, the three divisions† of General Kuroki's Army were kept in the neighbourhood of Wiju, hidden in the hollow ground between the banks of the river and the higher ground to the south. To each division a section of the river bank was allotted for purposes of defence, and the sentry line, which was always kept concealed, ran along the left bank of the southern channel. No one was permitted to surmount the high ground along this bank, and the utmost care was exercised to conceal all movements from the Russians.

North of the Ya-lu‡ the Russian forces had been gradually strengthened, and, at the beginning of April the following units of Russian troops the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, under Major-General Kashtalinski, were present on that river:—
9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th East Siberian Rifle Regiments.||
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Batteries, 3rd East Siberian Artillery Brigade.
One machine gun company.

* It would seem that a track through Liu-chia-kou leading to Feng-huang-cheng, was also intended to be used.

† For the Order of Battle of the First Japanese Army see Appendix C.

‡ The composition and distribution of the Russian forces available for operations in Manchuria at the end of April is given in Appendix B.

|| The newly formed third battalions of these regiments had not yet arrived.

On the 3rd April, Major-General Mishchenko, part of whose cavalry had been watching the northern border of Korea since the outbreak of the war, and had penetrated some distance into that country, joined Major-General Kashtalinski, and the mounted troops then assembled were as follows:—

1st Argun Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment.
 1st Chita Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment.
 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment.
 Ussuri Cossack Regiment.
 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Battery (6 guns).
 1st East Siberian Mountain Battery (8 guns).

The total force now under Major-General Kashtalinski amounted to eight battalions, twenty-three squadrons,* twenty-four field guns, six horse artillery guns, eight mountain guns, and eight machine guns.

These troops formed what the Russians termed the "Eastern Force," to the command of which Lieutenant-General Zasulich was appointed on the 12th April. That force was to consist of the 3rd and 6th East Siberian Rifle Divisions and the cavalry under Major-General Mishchenko. The other units which were still required to raise it to full strength were being hurried south as they became available.

On the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd April, the 22nd and 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiments and the 2nd and 3rd Batteries, 6th East Siberian Artillery Brigade left Liao-yang and reached Feng-huang-cheng on the 14th April. Thence they proceeded to the Ya-lu, except six companies of the 24th Regiment, which remained on the line of communication repairing roads.

On the 10th and 12th April, the newly-formed third battalions of the 9th and 10th East Siberian Rifle Regiments left Liao-yang, and on the 24th April they arrived on the Ya-lu.

On the 13th, the 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment, except one company† which remained in the Pri-Amur District, and the 1st Battery, 6th East Siberian Artillery Brigade left Hai-cheng for Ta-ku-shan, and reached that place on the 21st April.

On the 14th and 16th April, the newly-formed third battalions of the 11th and 12th East Siberian Rifle Regiments started from Liao-yang and arrived on the Ya-lu on the 25th and 26th April respectively.

On the 16th April, the 22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment reached the Ya-lu.

On the 21st April, a mountain battery, escorted by a company of the 10th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, left Feng-huang-cheng for Chang-tien-cheng, twenty-eight miles north-east of Wiju.

* One squadron of the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment was at Port Arthur.

† Another Russian authority states that one company of this regiment was on line-of-communication duty between Hai-cheng and Ta-ku-shan. There were, however, 11 companies at Ta-ku-shan.

General Zasulich's dispositions, 26th April. On the 22nd, Lieutenant-General Zasulich arrived on the Ya-lu and assumed command, and on the 26th, in accordance with orders issued by him, his troops* were disposed as follows:—

(a) At An-tung, under Major-General Kashtalinski—

- 2½ battalions of the 10th Regiment.
- 2 companies of the 24th Regiment.
- 1st/3rd Battery.
- 1 machine gun company.
- Mounted scouts of the 9th, 10th, and 11th Regiments.

In all, approximately, 2,580 bayonets, 400 scouts, 8 field guns, and 8 machine guns.

(b) At Chiu-lien-cheng, under Major-General Trusov—

- 12th Regiment.
- 22nd Regiment.
- 2nd/6th and 3rd/6th Batteries.
- Mounted scouts of the 12th and 22nd Regiments.

In all, approximately, 5,200 bayonets, 240 scouts, and 16 guns.

(c) At Tien-tzu, in reserve—

- 9th Regiment.
- 11th Regiment.
- 2nd/3rd and 3rd/3rd Batteries.

In all, approximately, 5,200 to 5,400 bayonets and 16 guns.

(d) From An-ping-ho to Hsiao-pu-hsi-ho,† watching the left flank, under Colonel Trukhin—

- 6 squadrons of the 1st Argun Cossack Regiment.
- 5 squadrons of the Ussuri Cossack Regiment.‡
- 1 battalion of the 24th Regiment.
- 1 company of the 10th Regiment.
- 1 mountain battery.

In all, approximately, 1,250 sabres, 1,000 bayonets, and 8 mountain guns.

(e) From the Kou-wang-kou River to Ta-ku-shan, watching the right flank, under Major-General Mishchenko—

- 1st Chita Cossack Regiment.
- 2½ squadrons§ of the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment.
- 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Battery.

* All the infantry and artillery were East Siberian units. 1/22nd stands for 1st Battalion, 22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment; and 3rd/6th Battery, for 3rd Battalion, 6th East Siberian Artillery Brigade.

† See Map II.

‡ One squadron of this regiment was detached further up the Ya-lu with Colonel Madritov's detachment.

§ Two and a half squadrons watched the coast line from Ta-tung-kou to Pi-tzu-wo. The 6th squadron, as already mentioned, was at Port Arthur.

2½ battalions of the 21st Regiment.
1st/6th Battery.

In all, approximately, 1,100 sabres, 2,400 bayonets, 8 field, and 6 horse artillery guns.

In addition to the above, the following units were in rear guarding the line of communication, viz.—

2 companies of the 24th Regiment, at Feng-huang-cheng.
2 companies of the 24th Regiment, from Ta-ku-shan to Hai-cheng.

2 companies of the 24th Regiment and 1 company of the 10th Regiment, from An-tung to Lien-shan-kuan.*

The combatant strength of the above troops of the Eastern Force†, excluding the seven companies on lines of communication, amounted to some 16,000 bayonets, 2,350 sabres, and 650 mounted scouts, with 48 field guns, 8 mountain guns, and 6 horse artillery guns. The extreme front watched by this force extended from Pi-tzu-wo through Ta-tung-kou to Hsiao-pu-hsi-ho, a distance of about one hundred and seventy-two miles. The line of retreat was to be on Feng-huang-cheng, but the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment was to fall back on Hai-cheng.

General Kuropatkin's despatches, about this time to his subordinate commander on the Ya-lu, are full of interest. In one of these he shows anxiety regarding the difficulties of retreat by the single road leading to Feng-huang-cheng, and points out the necessity for keeping it in good repair; in others he enquires whether the position at that place has been fortified, what measures have been taken to destroy supplies on retirement, and draws attention to the undesirability of any trophies falling into the hands of the Japanese. He seems to have been fully aware of Lieutenant-General Zasulich's detailed dispositions on the Ya-lu, for he refers to the necessity of avoiding the intermixture of units of the two divisions represented there, and expresses the hope that the distribution of troops, down to companies, under the command of Major-General Kashtalinski, has been made "not contrary to the opinion of that general officer." In one of his later despatches, received shortly before the battle, he concludes with the hope that the enemy will be resisted with the necessary firmness, but also with prudence, and reminds Lieutenant-General Zasulich that he is posted on the Ya-lu "not for a decisive action with the enemy in superior numbers." On the 25th April, he reiterates his instructions that Lieutenant-General Zasulich's duty is to delay the crossing of the Japanese, and to observe their numbers and organization; that he is not to allow himself to be involved in an unequal combat, but should retire slowly, keeping in close touch with the enemy.‡

* Lien-shan-kuan is midway between Feng-huang-cheng and Liao-yang.

† For the Order of Battle of the Eastern Force, see Appendix C.

‡ There is good reason to believe that Lieut.-General Zasulich had conflicting orders. On the one hand, General Kuropatkin intended him to fight a rear-guard action, while on the other, Admiral Alexeiev pressed him to offer a vigorous resistance.

The Japanese, on their side, had lost no time in adding to their information regarding the enemy's numbers and position. Spies, scouts, and officers with telescopes posted on the heights behind Wiju, all served a useful purpose. Their task was much facilitated by the lack of concealment on the part of the Russians, who showed themselves not only on the high ground across the river, but watered their horses at the Ai Ho, and exercised them on the sandy flats in the river bed. The temptation to punish them for their temerity by opening fire with artillery, was great, but was resisted.

The Japanese preliminary operations. By the 22nd April, the strength of General Zasulich's force was estimated at 5,000 cavalry, 15,000 infantry, and 60 guns, and the general line of his entrenchments and the nature of the defences about An-tung were known.*

Up to the 24th, no definite knowledge of the river had been gained, while the changes which had occurred in its channel since it was crossed in 1894, made maps prepared beforehand useless. Fords that had existed at that time no longer could be found, and points then out of rifle range were now exposed to fire.

By the 25th, material for bridges had been prepared, but the reconnoissance of the main streams of the Ya-lu and the Ai could not be completed owing to the presence of the enemy's outposts on the right bank. It was necessary to obtain possession of the islands of Kyuri and Kintei, and for that duty a battalion of the Guards and a battalion of the 2nd Division were detailed. Seizure of islands by the Japanese. At 4 a.m. on the 26th, while it was still dark, two pontoon loads of Guards started on their venturesome mission, to assist which supports were extended along the left bank of the stream. All went well until mid-stream was reached, when suddenly a bright light broke upon the darkness, and the scene became illuminated. A Russian sentry of the mounted scout detachment of the 22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment which held Kyuri Island, hearing the splash of oars, had fired a straw torch placed upright in the ground, and brought to view the coming danger. Volleys were poured upon the boats, killing and wounding several men, but the rowers kept their course and the shore was soon reached, when the Guardsmen, springing out, opened a heavy fire, before which the Russians retired with a loss of eighteen killed and wounded.

Kyuri Island was now in Japanese hands, and before daylight the 2nd Division had secured Kintei without suffering loss. The effect of these successes led the enemy to withdraw his outposts on Tiger Hill, although he still retained possession of the village of Chukodai, which lies opposite the island of Kintei. There he was permitted to remain for the present, but the Japanese were now able to push their outposts forward to the left bank of the main stream, and send across it scouting parties who interrupted communication between a Russian detachment posted at An-

* It will be observed that the Japanese estimate of the Russian numbers only exceeded the actual force present on the 22nd April by 1,000 men and 2 guns.

ping-ho and Lieutenant-General Zasulich's headquarters. The reconnaissance of the river could now be undertaken, and work was forthwith begun on the necessary bridges, of which ten were eventually constructed. Their aggregate length amounted to 1,630 yards,* one-third of which was built of regular pontoons, the remainder of materials obtained locally, or brought from the landing place at Rikaho.

On the 26th and 27th, the channel between Wiju and the island of Kintei was bridged, the work taking forty-five hours, for the enemy opened with shrapnel on the engineers. This bridge, the construction of which took longer than that of any other, was not made use of in the attack, but was intended purely as a blind. Just below it where the stream was narrower, a shorter bridge to carry guns was built. This was effected during the night of the 27th-28th, and four other bridges, A, B, C, and D, were made between the 26th and 28th. These last played an important part in the movements that preceded the attack, the double means of passage which they afforded over the streams near Genkado permitting wheeled traffic to come and go continuously, while in case of damage to one set the other would remain. All of the bridges were from time to time subjected to fire, direct or indirect, but none of them was destroyed by Russian guns, for shrapnel shell alone was fired.

Although the Russians had fallen back from Tiger Hill on the 26th, they still held the high ground to the north of it, and kept their sentries posted on the right bank of the Ya-lu. Little was known about this district, but as the plan contemplated by the Japanese involved a march across it, the Chinese inhabitants were examined, and reconnaissances involving considerable risk were made by officers. From these sources it was ascertained that the ground, though difficult, was not impassable, and that it could be traversed by troops lightly equipped and also by mountain guns. Armed with this information the actual point for crossing the Ya-lu could now be fixed upon. At Suikuchin, north of Wiju, the river runs in two channels enclosing an island between them, and the stream nearest the Russian bank, contrary to

*DETAIL OF BRIDGES CONSTRUCTED.

	Length.	Nature.	Time taken in construction.
Bridge to Kintei Island	256	Trestle	45 hours.
Bridge to Kintei Island	87	Trestle	8 "
Bridge A	122	Trestle	16 "
Bridge B	116	Trestle	13 "
Bridge C	37	Trestle }	9 "
Bridge D	33	Trestle }	8 "
Bridge E	257	Pontoon	8 "
Bridge F	99	Pontoon (?)	8 "
Bridge G	336	Trestle	10 "
Bridge at Suikuchin ...	287	Mostly Pontoon	13 "
Total length	1,630yds.		

expectation, was found to be the shallower. To throw a bridge to the island would not be difficult, and to effect this a covering position could be taken upon the hills in front by troops sent across the river in pontoons. It was decided therefore that the 12th Division should cross at Suikuchin, and that the attack of the First Army should be delivered on a front from Chukodai to Sa-lan-kou.

For the proper timing of this movement, the 12th Division must cross the Ya-lu one day before the other troops, an operation which involved its temporary isolation. It was felt, however, that the risk would not be great, for the Russians still maintained a passive attitude and did not seem to be affected by what was now proceeding on their left. Moreover, their attention had been drawn to their right by a feint* made by a Japanese naval detachment on the 25th and 26th. On the former date, six small armed vessels entered the estuary of the Ya-lu towards evening, drawing the enemy's fire, and next day proceeded slowly up the river, sounding as they went. These were followed by several junks carrying timber, whose appearance led the Russians to believe that a crossing at An-tung was intended.

At 10 a.m. on the 28th April, General Kuroki issued orders for the attack to take place on the 1st May. The main points of these orders were as follows:—

1. The 12th Division was to cross the Ya-lu at Suikuchin on the night of the 29th, and, with the duty of covering the passage of the remainder of the Army, was to occupy the ridge running north and south-eastward of Hsia-ling-tao-kou and Li-tzu-yuan; the left flank was to rest on hill 955'. A detachment was to march down the right bank of the river and occupy hill 630'. A further detachment was to move beyond the right flank by Chiao-chia-kou, to threaten the enemy's left and rear. On the 1st May the division was to occupy the line Sa-lan-kou to the hill marked "K," west of Li-tzu-yuan.
2. The 2nd Division was to assemble near Shasando, east of Wiju, by 10 a.m. on the 30th, and starting at midnight, was to march *via* bridges C, A, E, and F, and occupy a line on Chukodai Island† before dawn on the 1st May. The artillery of the division was to be in position on Kintei Island, opposite the village of Chukodai, ready to open fire at daybreak on the 30th.
3. The Guard Division was to assemble between Wiju and Hibokudo by 10 a.m. on the 30th. This division was to follow the same route and cross the same bridges as the 2nd Division, and occupy a line between the 12th and 2nd Divisions.

* There appears to have been a small detachment of infantry of the 2nd Division at Yongampo (see Map II).

† This island was to be reached by crossing the two bridges E and F—constructed on the 30th April—and by passing immediately north of Tiger Hill.

4. The howitzers* were to take up a position on Kintei Island on the night of the 29th.
5. The reserve, consisting of five squadrons and five battalions, was to assemble on Kyuri Island by 4 a.m. on the 1st May, with the exception of one battalion, which was to be stationed on the left of the howitzers to protect the artillery on Kintei Island.

It will be observed that, in accordance with these orders, the 2nd and Guard Divisions would follow the same route. This procedure, although liable to cause delay, was necessary, as the main stream of the Ya-lu was broad and in close proximity to the enemy, and only sufficient pontoons were available for a single bridge. The 2nd Division was to lead, for the distance to be marched by it was somewhat greater than that to be traversed by the Guards, who were not required to be in position at such an early hour as the troops on their left.

To carry out its orders and cross the Ya-lu on the night of the 29th, the 12th Division began preparations for bridging the river at an early hour on that date, and to protect the engineers engaged in the work three batteries were placed in position near Chukyuri. These opened fire at 11 a.m. and, in conjunction with some infantry, forced the Russian sentries posted on the island opposite Suikuchin to retire, together with a party of some forty or fifty Cossack cavalry and two guns which came up at that hour.

The Russian troops at this point† were under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Gusev, and consisted of two companies of infantry (one company of the 10th and another of the 24th Regiment), two mountain guns and three squadrons of the Ussuri Cossack Regiment. A stronger detachment under Colonel Lechitski had originally been posted on the right bank of the Ya-lu watching the passage at Suikuchin, but that officer had received orders from Lieutenant-General Zasulich that, if Li-tzu-yuan were occupied by the Japanese, he was to fall back to Hung-shih-la,‡ or even further north. On the morning of the 28th, Colonel Lechitski, in view of the continued presence of the Japanese on Tiger Hill, and of reports that more were crossing to the right bank of the river north of that place, had decided that the time to retire had come. He therefore had left Lieutenant-Colonel Gusev with a small force at An-ping-ho, and sent one company of the 24th Regiment to watch the road from Li-tzu-yuan to Hung-shih-la, while he himself, with two companies of the same regiment and four mountain guns had fallen back to the latter place.

When Lieutenant-General Zasulich received news of the activity of the 12th Division, he ordered the remainder of the left

* Twenty 12-cm. (4'72-in.) Krupp howitzers, bought secretly before the war, were landed at Rikaho between the 10th and 21st April, and had been brought to Wiju. Parts of the road thither had to be prepared with planks to facilitate their movement. These guns fired 46'3 lb. shells filled with high explosives.

† The troops at An-ping-ho belonged to Colonel Trukhin's left flank detachment, see p. 55.

‡ See Map II.

flank detachment under Colonel Trukhin to move to Chiu-liu-an, so as to cover the road to Sai-ma-chi, regarding which he felt some anxiety. He also decided to send a battalion of the 24th Regiment and four guns to join Lieutenant-Colonel Gusev's force. This reinforcement, added to the troops already near An-ping-ho, would, he considered, suffice to force back the Japanese who had crossed the Ya-lu and to recover the ground that had been lost. The order, however, to carry out this reinforcement appears not to have been issued at once, and on the 30th the attitude of the 12th Division led to its being countermanded. A report of what had occurred was sent to General Kuropatkin, who in reply suggested that the detachment at An-ping-ho seemed to have fallen back too hastily and too far, and that it was important not to lose touch with the enemy. According to his view, the Japanese operations on Lieutenant-General Zasulich's left were wanting in that energy which usually betokens some movement more serious than a mere demonstration. Nevertheless, he impressed upon his subordinate commander the necessity for keeping a careful watch along the whole front of the position, and of preparing for a serious attack upon his left and centre, a counsel which was reiterated in a later despatch.

Meanwhile the 12th Division had taken another step towards the passage of the river. At noon, a regiment of infantry, as covering party, was sent across in pontoons, drawing upon itself the fire of the enemy, who after leaving the island, had fallen back to the high ground on the right bank. A few casualties occurred, but by 2 p.m. a battalion reached that bank, whereupon the Russians fell back to Hung-shih-la, and the construction of the bridge began. At the site selected the river was twenty-four feet deep and flowed with a velocity of about four miles an hour. Consequently many anchors were required to keep the pontoons in position and, as insufficient regulation material was forthcoming, some local junks had to be used.

South of the 12th Division an incident occurred on this date which, though in no way affecting the general plan of the Japanese, caused them some inconvenience. At 4 p.m. a battalion of the 22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment, the mounted scouts of the 10th and 12th Regiments, and two guns of the 3rd/6th Battery, crossed the valley of the Ai from opposite Li-tzu-yuan, and supported by artillery fire from Po-te-tien-tzu, forced the Guards' outpost* company on Tiger Hill to fall back to Kyuri Island. The retreat was conducted in good order, and, as the enemy did not show himself over the brow of the hill, only a few shells were fired by the Guard Artillery. The loss of the hill, however, prevented bridge E from being made during the night of the 29th, as had been intended, but to facilitate its rapid construction on the following day, materials were collected at Genkado.

The same night, with the view of assisting the 12th Division to occupy its allotted position on the right of the Army, the artillery

* Tiger Hill had been occupied by the Japanese when the Russians withdrew from it on the 26th April.

of the 2nd Division and the howitzers crossed the short bridge leading to Kintei, and before daybreak were entrenched in the sandy soil of that island. In order effectually to conceal the howitzers and the flash and smoke emitted on discharge, screens of drift timber, found upon the island, and trees were placed a short distance in front of the batteries; great care was also exercised lest the general view of the landscape should appear altered from the Russian side. Water was thrown before the batteries to keep down dust, platforms were erected, hidden in trees on the flanks, whence officers could, to some extent, watch the fire effect, and two observation posts connected with the batteries by telephone were placed upon the hills south of Wiju. These posts and the batteries were furnished with duplicate maps of the enemy's position, divided into squares, so that observers might direct the fire of the howitzers on any point where a suitable target appeared. So well were the howitzers hidden, that on this date and on the 1st May not a single Russian shell reached them. As it was thought advisable to conceal the presence of the howitzers until the 1st May, both they and the guns of the 2nd Division were to remain silent on the 30th April. Their orders, however, allowed them to fire if a good opportunity arose, or to reply if the enemy opened a cannonade.

On the morning of the 30th April the Russians, who had occupied Tiger Hill on the previous evening were observed to be busily engaged in entrenching themselves, whereupon the artillery of the Guard Division opened fire and soon forced them to retire. No reply came from the enemy's guns, whose custom it had been to shell the Japanese daily about 7 a.m. At 10 a.m. some Japanese engineers in two or three boats began the survey of the main stream opposite Chukodai, and at 10.30 the 2nd/6th Battery, posted on the high ground north-east of Chiu-lien-cheng, opened fire upon them. Immediately the guns and howitzers on Kintei Island replied, and in half an hour the Russian guns were overpowered and silenced.*

About 11 a.m. four guns from the 3rd/6th Battery opened fire from the knoll east of Ma-kou, but were silenced by a few rounds from three batteries of the Guard Artillery, which had advanced to Kyuri Island at 4 a.m.

While this artillery action was in progress, the 12th Division was approaching its allotted position. At 3 a.m., the bridge at Suikuchin being ready, the division had begun to cross, and on reaching the right bank of the Ya-lu had pushed forward in three columns. Two of these, the right and centre, followed parallel tracks through the hills, while the third column marched along the right bank of the river and thence climbed to the high ground at point 955' sending a detachment to the hill marked 630'. The right column, consisting of a squadron and a battalion of infantry,† was ordered to make a turning movement by Chiao-chia-kou, and

* The casualties in the 2nd/6th Battery during this bombardment were 5 officers and 26 rank and file killed and wounded.

† There seems also to have been a mountain battery with this detachment.

threaten the enemy's extreme left, but so weak a force did not promise much result.

The advance of this division was not unnoticed by the Russians, and was reported to Major-General Kashtalinski, who had replaced Major-General Trusov* in command of the troops at Chiu-lien-cheng. That officer forthwith despatched half of the I/22nd Regiment to Ching-kou, to join the other half of the same battalion, and the two guns of the 3rd/6th Battery, which had been posted there on the 28th to guard the left flank. At the same time he reported the situation to Lieutenant-General Zasulich, who informed him in reply that the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Regiment was on its way to join him from Tien-tzu, and that he was to maintain his position.

By noon, the 12th Division had reached the line assigned to it, when the Russians on Tiger Hill, finding their left imperilled, fell back across the Ai Ho with a loss of four killed and forty-one wounded. The hill was then re-occupied by a battalion of the Guards, and another battalion followed to prepare a road for guns across Kyuri and Oseki Islands. The retreat of the Russians was the signal for work to begin on the bridges at E, F, and G, and by 8 p.m. all except the bridge at G were ready.

During the day arrangements were made to transport the artillery of the 2nd Division across the main stream of the Ya-lu, in order that it might support the attack of the infantry of that division at a range closer than was possible from its position on Kintei Island. To bridge the stream, which opposite the batteries was five hundred yards in width, was impossible, and it was decided therefore to send the guns across at night on pontoon ferries, of which twenty-one were constructed behind Genkado and floated down to Kintei. Such was the difficulty of the operation, due to the necessity of working in the dark, that by daybreak on the 1st May only three batteries and the battalion of infantry forming the escort had crossed and entrenched themselves.

At 8 p.m. the 2nd Division moved off from Shasando,† and by 10.30 p.m. had reached Oseki village, leaving the bridges clear for the Guard Division which was following. At 2.30 a.m. the 2nd Division again moved forward and crossed the bridge to Tiger Hill, after which Chukodai Island was reached by fording one of the channels of the Ai. By daybreak on the 1st May this division was entrenched in the open within 2,000 yards of the Russian position, the batteries which had been ferried across the main stream being posted on its left immediately north of Chukodai village. The Guards, whose march had been delayed by the necessity of using the same bridge as the 2nd Division, reached their allotted ground about 5 a.m. and likewise entrenched themselves; while on their right stood the 12th Division, which had been joined by its detachment from Siojo.‡ Three days' supplies

* Major-General Trusov had fallen sick on the 28th instant.

† The 2nd Division had been ordered originally to march at midnight (see p. 59), an hour which must have been altered subsequently to 8 p.m.

‡ This detachment (see p. 47) had originally covered the right flank of the First Army in the advance from Anju, after which it had moved down the Ya-lu from Chyangsyong to Siojo.

for the whole Army had been collected, and on the 30th April the base at Rikaho was closed, the boats there being ordered to proceed to the south of An-tung, where they would await the issue of the battle.

The blow which had been preceded by such elaborate and deliberate preparations, was now about to fall. Frequent warnings from the Russian Commander-in-Chief and reports from Major-General Kashtalinski had not availed to impress Lieutenant-General Zasulich with the danger on his left, and he still seems to have clung to the belief that the Japanese would land an army on his right. The naval feints near the mouth of the Ya-lu, which were repeated on the 29th and 30th April, and the appearance of vessels in the offing, possibly carrying troops, had served their purpose, and the main portion of the Eastern Force still remained massed in the vicinity and in rear of An-tung. The battle was to be fought on a front from Chui-lien-cheng to Ching-kou and here Major-General Kashtalinski, who had been ordered to maintain his ground had, on the 30th, disposed his troops as follows* :—

Right Section. From Chiu-lien-cheng to Yao-kou.

1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 12th Regiment.
3 companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Regiment.
1 company of the 2nd Battalion of the 24th Regiment.†
2nd Battery of the 6th Artillery Brigade.

Left Section. From Ma-kou through Po-te-tien-tzu to Ching-kou.

1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 22nd Regiment.
1 company of the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Regiment.
3rd Battery of the 6th Artillery Brigade.

Thus a force of little more than seven battalions and sixteen guns was distributed over a front of some six miles, and was about to bear the whole brunt of the Japanese attack. Both the batteries had been subjected to Japanese artillery fire, and the 2nd/6th Battery, which had lost several officers, had withdrawn on the night of the 30th to a position about one mile west of Chiu-lien-cheng. Moreover, the bombardment had not been without effect upon the infantry, and at 11 p.m. on that date Colonel Tsibulski, who commanded the 12th Regiment, pointed out to Major-General Kashtalinski that the shells of the Japanese guns of position were quite "unbearable, and that he could not guarantee the quiet withdrawal of his men from their trenches if fire were specially directed upon them, on the following day."‡ He added that the Japanese were undoubtedly in superior force, and that there was every reason to expect an assault. Upon this Major-General Kashtalinski despatched a telegram to Lieutenant-General

* See Maps III and IV.

† This company had probably been called up from the line of communication in order to take part in the battle.

‡ According to a Russian authority the 12th Regiment had suffered, on the 30th April, a loss of 3 officers and 20 rank and file killed and wounded,

Zasulich at San-cheng-kou, in which, after a brief description of the bombardment, he suggested that his force should occupy the heights behind Chiu-lien-cheng during the night, leaving outposts in the advanced trenches with orders to fall back at daylight. Lieutenant-General Zasulich replied that the troops were at no point to evacuate the ground occupied, but that he had decided that in the event of a bombardment, they were to leave outposts on the original positions and withdraw to the nearest heights with the view of taking cover, but not of retiring. At 3 a.m. on the 1st May, a report came in from the 12th Regiment that the sound of wheels on the islands and the noise of guns crossing bridges was audible, and it became evident that the Japanese were preparing to attack. No change was, however, made in the strength of the groups at An-tung and Tien-tzu, though the machine-gun company was sent to Major-General Kashtalinski.

When day broke a thick fog hung over the valley between the opposing armies, but about 6 a.m. it began to lift, and the Japanese batteries opened fire. At first no reply came from the Russian side, and for a brief space it seemed to the Japanese as if the enemy had fallen back. Suddenly the six guns of the 3rd/6th Battery near Ma-kou replied, but in a few minutes they were silenced, and the whole of the Japanese artillery was turned against the shelter trenches of the infantry.

The attack of the Japanese had been planned originally to begin with the turning movement of the 12th Division on their right, where the least resistance was expected, and as soon as its advance had sufficiently progressed the Guard and 2nd Divisions were to move. But as the Russians brought no other artillery into action after the battery near Ma-kou had been silenced General Kuroki, about 7 a.m., ordered a simultaneous advance by his three divisions.

At the word of command the Japanese rose from their trenches and surged across the space between them and the enemy, their dark blue uniforms rendering them conspicuous objects on the yellow sandy plain. No shot greeted their thick line of skirmishers until the Ai Ho was reached, when the Russians opened a heavy fire of volleys at distances varying from 1,500 to 1,200 paces. To cross a swiftly-flowing river whose waters run breast-high is, under no conditions, a very simple matter, but the same operation performed under a hail of bullets by troops burdened with arms and ammunition* makes the preservation of order difficult. Thus by the time that the Japanese had arrived in mid-stream their formations were disorganized, and the men, crowded together in places, were suffering many losses, some of the wounded being drowned. Nevertheless the advance was steadily pursued, and on reaching the further bank individual fire was opened. During the infantry advance the divisional artillery

The Japanese advance to the attack.

* The 12th Division carried lightened knapsacks. The Guard and 2nd Divisions carried spare ammunition, and rations in the blue cloth holdall worn *en bandoulière*, but discarded their knapsacks before the attack.

had ceaselessly shelled the Russian infantry position, while the howitzers, still using indirect fire, searched the ground in rear of it.

While crossing the river, the 2nd Division, whose attack brought it opposite the right section of the Russian position from Chiu-lien-cheng to Yao-kou, suffered considerable loss, more especially on its left. The troops with which it was engaged,—I, II, and III/12th Regiment, three companies of the 11th Regiment, the 8th Company 24th Regiment, the 2nd/6th Battery, and the machine gun company—were under the command of Colonel Tsibulski and were posted as follows* :—

- (a) On the right, south west of Chiu-lien-cheng—
5th, 6th and 8th Companies of the 11th Regiment, and 8th Company 24th Regiment.
- (b) North of Chiu-lien-cheng—
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 9th and 12th Companies of the 12th Regiment.
- (c) In rear of (b) as local reserve—
7th and 8th Companies of the 12th Regiment.
- (d) Sectional reserve—
1st, 5th, 10th and 11th Companies of the 12th Regiment and the machine gun company.
- (e) About a mile west of Chiu-lien-cheng—
2nd/6th Battery.

The losses suffered by the left of the Japanese 2nd Division delayed the advance of that flank, but the 4th and 29th Regiments which formed the right were able to push on and succeeded in forcing the Russians in front of them from their trenches, whence they fell back to a second position on the hills in rear, exposing themselves to the fire of the Japanese artillery. The 6th Company of the 12th Regiment tried to cover the retreat by a bayonet charge, but the Japanese skirmishers, giving way before it, cleared the front of their reserves whose fire drove it off. The advance was then continued, and the safety of the Russian battery, which, though out of action had remained in position, became endangered.

While the right of the 2nd Division was progressing, the left began again to move forward and threatened to surround Colonel Tsibulski's force. This was observed by Major-General Kashtalinski, whose left section, under Colonel Gromov, was also at this time in difficulties. About 8.30 a.m., therefore, he ordered Colonel Tsibulski to withdraw his troops to a position† behind the Han-tu-hoz-tzu stream, where he hoped to be able to delay the Japanese advance against his right. This position had been previously selected and Lieutenant-General Zasulich himself, after conferring with Major-General Kashtalinski, had decided that the time to occupy it had arrived. The operation of withdrawal was a difficult one, for the right of the Japanese 2nd Division

* See Map IV.

† This position, which is several times referred to in the narrative, was situated on the high ground immediately west of the words, Han-tu-ho-tzu, R. on Map IV.

had made considerable progress, and only by the bayonet charge of several companies was it achieved.

On the right of the 2nd Division the advance of the Guard Division brought it opposite the left section of the Russian line of defence, where the troops, consisting of the
 The Guard II and III/22nd Regiment, 7th Company of the 11th
 Division. Regiment and 3rd/6th Battery under Colonel
 Gromov were posted as follows* :—

- (a) On the high ground north-east of Ma-kou—
 10th and 11th Companies of the 22nd Regiment.
- (b) In rear of (a)—
 3rd/6th Battery (6 guns only ; 2 guns of this battery had been detached to Ching-kou with the I/22nd Regiment).
- (c) North of Po-te-tien-tzu—
 7th Company of the 11th Regiment, and 12th Company of the 22nd Regiment.
- (d) Further up the Ai Ho, separated from the rest of the force south of it by a gap nearly 2,000 yards wide—
 5th Company of the 22nd Regiment.
- (e) Sectional reserve, behind the right flank—
 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th Companies of the 22nd Regiment.

The baggage of this section had been sent back to Ching-kou,† and the battery, which had reserved its fire for the infantry attack, had been silenced by the Japanese artillery.

The right of the Guard Division soon penetrated the gap between Po-te-tien-tzu and the 5th Company of the 22nd Regiment, imperilling the position of the troops further south, who were fully engaged with those immediately in front of them. To restore the situation by bringing up fresh troops was impossible, for the sectional reserve was too far distant and its presence on the right was urgently required.

At this time, too, a report was received that the Japanese were coming on in force against the left flank. Thereupon Colonel Gromov rode in that direction and saw some five or six hostile battalions advancing from the heights on the left bank of the Ai Ho, about one mile north-east of his position. It appeared evident to him that the enemy's main attack was directed against his left near Po-te-tien-tzu, and that the 5th Company of the 22nd Regiment could not prevent the threatening movement. About 8.30 a.m., therefore, he decided to recall that company, throw back his left and take up a position on the ridge which runs parallel to the Ching-kou road, where he hoped to be joined by the I/22nd Regiment and the two guns of the 3rd/6th Battery. Orders were sent to the sectional reserve to occupy the ridge and cover the retirement of the fighting line, the left of which would fall back

* See Map IV.

† Major-General Kashtalinski had directed Colonel Gromov, in the event of serious action, to send his transport to Ching-kou, whence he was to retire by Liu-chia-kou. From the latter place Feng-huang-cheng can be reached by a road which is practically parallel to the An-tung-Feng-huang-cheng highway.

first. Scarcely had these orders been despatched when the commander of the 3rd/6th Battery reported that the right of Colonel Gromov's section of defence was turned and that his guns could no longer remain in their present position. The inner flanks of the Guard and 2nd Divisions had both broken through the Russian front between Yao-kou and Ma-kou, and the battery was in imminent danger of capture. It was therefore ordered to fall back, and the 7th Company of the 22nd Regiment, from the sectional reserve, was detailed to act as escort. The three remaining companies of the sectional reserve began, about 9 a.m., to withdraw to the ridge in rear, being followed by the 5th and 12th Companies of the 22nd Regiment, which had formed the left of the firing line.

Meantime the 3rd/6th Battery, accompanied by its escort and the 10th Company of the 22nd Regiment, which had originally been posted in front of it, had begun to retire; but so steep was the ground over which it had to move that the guns had to be unlimbered and lowered one by one down the western slope of the abandoned position, an operation which was carried out under heavy rifle fire from the Japanese on the left bank of the Ai Ho. When, shortly after 9 a.m., the battery reached the lower ground, it must have found the road leading northward to be impassable or already commanded by the enemy's fire, for instead of making for Ching-kou it proceeded in a southerly direction toward Chiu-lien-cheng. This movement was observed by Colonel Gromov, who directed it to turn about in the direction of Po-te-tien-tzu and thence move on Ching-kou. The battery now seems to have outstripped its escort, whose strength had been augmented by the 7th Company of the 11th Regiment and the 11th Company of the 22nd Regiment, which had joined it on the march. On reaching Po-te-tien-tzu the commander found the road to Ching-kou blocked by the enemy and decided to retire by Chiu-lien-cheng. The guns were once more turned about and proceeded toward Ma-kou, near which place they were captured by the 3rd Regiment of the Japanese Guard Division.

In the meantime, Colonel Gromov, after despatching orders to the battery, had grown anxious lest his own line of retreat should be intercepted by the advancing Japanese, and had decided not to hold a second position, but to retire with his five remaining companies to Ching-kou.* The Russian detachment at that place faced the right wing of the 12th Division, whose advance was slow, for the men were much fatigued, having crossed the Ya-lu on the night of the 29th April and marched through difficult country on the 30th. Moreover, the left battalions of the Division crossed the Ai Ho where the water was deep, and, though

* The 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th and 12th Companies of the 22nd Regiment. The 7th and 10th Companies, after becoming separated from the guns, joined him on the march, while the 7th Company of the 11th Regiment and the 11th Company of the 22nd Regiment turned westward across the hills. The 7th Company, 11th Regiment made its way to Tien-tzu, and the 11th Company, 22nd Regiment, took part in fighting which occurred later in the day near Ha-ma-tang.

no enemy opposed them, the heights at Fang-tai-tung-tzu were not reached till nearly 9 a.m.

When the 1st Battalion of the 14th Regiment and the mountain battery which formed the extreme right of General Kuroki's army reached Tuan-shan-tzu, the 1/22nd Regiment and the two guns of the 3rd/6th Battery finding their flank threatened began to retire. This movement was perceived by Colonel Gromov who, while falling back with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions* of that regiment, had observed some six or seven Japanese battalions pushing forward over the heights north of Po-te-tien-tzu. No sooner did the two Russian guns come in view, crossing the hill south of Ching-kou, in the direction of Lao-fang-kou, than he decided to incline westward and take up a position on the saddle over which the road connecting those two places runs.

The general situation at this period as regards the Russians was as follows: In the original disposition of Major-General Kashtalinski's force, seven battalions and sixteen guns had held the front from Chiu-lien-cheng to Ching-kou. Of this force the greater portion of the right section and the detachment at Ching-kou had succeeded in retiring in fair order, while of the remainder, which was under Colonel Gromov's command, six guns had been captured and two battalions, greatly shaken, had fallen back. To delay the enemy's further advance, Major-General Kashtalinski had at hand the 12th Regiment, the 5th, 6th and 8th Companies of the 11th Regiment, the 8th Company of the 24th Regiment, the 2nd/6th Battery, and the machine gun company. All of these troops had been engaged, and with them he now proceeded to take position on the right bank of the Han-tu-ho-tzu stream.†

On the right at An-tung nothing had occurred beyond the appearance of a Japanese flotilla in the river which had shelled the Russian position on that flank and had engaged the attention of the 1st/3rd Battery. The three battalions posted near An-tung, and the reserve of five battalions and sixteen guns at Tien-tzu, had remained inactive and had taken no share in the battle on their left.

On the Japanese side, the 2nd Division was concentrating in the neighbourhood of Chiu-lien-cheng with the General Reserve, which had advanced at 8 a.m. on its right at Suribachi Yama; the Guards were on the hills between Yao-kou and Po-te-tien-tzu; the left wing of the 12th Division was on the hill north of Po-te-tien-tzu, and the right was climbing the ridge west of Fang-tai-tung-tzu.

* The 11th Company of the 3rd Battalion was not present, having fallen back independently after accompanying the 3rd/6th Battery when it first retreated towards Chiu-lien-cheng.

† The withdrawal to the position on the Han-tu-ho-tzu stream was covered by the 5th and 6th Companies of the 11th Regiment and the 8th Company of the 24th Regiment. After carrying out the duty assigned to them these companies fell back to Tien-tzu. The 8th Company of the 11th Regiment remained with the 12th Regiment.

The artillery was placed as follows: Two batteries* of the 2nd Division had forded the river opposite Chiu-lien-cheng and were close to that place; the remaining batteries of the division were in position at the southern extremity of the island of Chukodai. The Guard Artillery had crossed the branch of the Ai Ho near Tiger Hill by an improvised bridge thirty-seven yards long, and had taken position between Yao-kou and Ma-kou; the 12th Artillery Regiment had also crossed to the right bank of the Ai Ho, and the howitzers remained on Kintei Island.

The Japanese had captured the Russian first position about 9 a.m., but instead of immediately pressing forward and allowing the enemy no time to reform, they appear to have halted for some hours. The exact cause for this halt is not quite clear, but it seems that the men were tired and hungry and General Kuroki was unwilling to attempt to force the second Russian position until they had had some food and rest. Moreover, the guns had to be moved forward from their original positions, whence they could not bring effective fire to bear upon the ground now held by the Russians, and a delay would allow the turning movement of the 12th Division to develop.

About 10 a.m., Lieutenant-General Zasulich came up to Major-General Kashtalinski's second position on the Han-tu-ho-tzu stream, and, after acquainting himself with the situation, ordered a general retirement.

Prior to this, at 9.35 a.m., the commander of the troops at An-tung had been directed to withdraw immediately to Tien-tzu, after burning the supplies collected at the former place. At the time the order reached him his force was somewhat scattered, the 2nd Company of the 10th Regiment and two guns of the 1st/3rd Battery being at San-chia-kou, some five miles to the south-west, while posted on the flanks and on the island of Kanshi were the mounted scouts of several infantry regiments. Orders were sent to the detachment at San-chia-kou to retire direct to Tang-shan-cheng on the road to Feng-huang-cheng, and by noon the troops at An-tung were falling back to Tien-tzu.

In order to extricate the transport which was collected at the latter place and to cover the movement of the An-tung force, Major-General Kashtalinski was directed to hold his ground and retard the Japanese advance to the utmost; and to assist him the I and III/11th Regiment and the 3rd/3rd Battery from the General Reserve were ordered up from Tien-tzu. South-east of Ha-ma-tang there is a gorge, through which the reinforcements had to pass on their way to the position on the right bank of the Han-tu-ho-tzu stream. In order to avoid the risk incurred by sending them through this defile, Major-General Kashtalinski directed the infantry to take post on the height east of Ha-ma-tang.

North-east of that place, on the saddle on the Ching-kou road, Colonel Gromov was joined about 11 a.m. by the I/22nd Regiment

* One authority states that these guns forded the river; another, that they were taken across in boats; and a third, that a bridge was improvised for their transit.

and two guns. As they came up the I/14th Japanese Regiment and six guns appeared at Ching-kou, but by the deployment of some Russian companies across the road their advance was for a time delayed. The heights to the south and south-east of the point where Colonel Gromov stood were still unoccupied by the Japanese, but as their infantry was seen moving, he decided to withdraw his troops and make good his retreat through Lao-fang-kou and Liu-chia-kou. He first sent off his wounded, then the two guns and the 2nd, 3rd, 7th and 10th Companies, and was preparing to follow with the rest of his command, when, about 1 p.m., an officer of Lieutenant-General Zasulich's staff rode up and ordered him to retreat by Lao-chou-tun. Colonel Gromov now marched the remnant of his force to that place, passing through it about 1.30 p.m., and reaching the line of communication without further loss.*

Prior to this, probably about 11.30 a.m., General Kuroki, who had reached Suribachi Yama, ordered the 2nd Division to move towards An-tung, covered by the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, and directed the four battalions in reserve,—two of the Guard Division, and two of the 30th Regiment—preceded by the Guard Cavalry, to pursue along the road to Feng-huang-cheng by Ha-ma-tang.

About mid-day, Lieutenant-General Nishi commanding the 2nd Division, came to General Kuroki and reported that he could only carry out his orders and proceed to An-tung by incurring heavy loss, as the Russians in position west of the Han-tu-ho-tzu stream commanded the one practicable road. He would therefore have to make a frontal attack without the aid of artillery, as the howitzers could not be brought up for a long time, and there was no position from which the 2nd Division Artillery could be brought into action against the enemy. General Kuroki then decided that, as he had carried the main position, it was not desirable to impose further heavy sacrifices on the troops by a direct attack and pursuit, and authorized Lieutenant-General Nishi to delay the movement pending further orders. Meanwhile the four battalions in reserve were also unable to make much progress, while the 12th Division was only impeded in its advance in a southerly direction by the fatigue of the men and the difficult nature of the country.

Nevertheless, it was the threat of this continued advance which caused Major-Gen. Kashtalinski, about 1.30 p.m., to begin to evacuate the position on the Han-tu-ho-tzu and to retire on Ha-ma-tang. Between 11 a.m. and noon, while he was waiting for the two battalions of the 11th Regiment to arrive, an assistant-surgeon of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division had reported to him that the 22nd Regiment on the extreme left was routed, and that the Japanese had occupied Liu-chia-kou. Up to that time, no anxiety had been felt regarding that flank, for no reports had been received from

* As, according to Russian accounts, the eleven companies with Colonel Gromov all reached the Feng-huang-cheng road through Lao-chou-tun, it would seem that the four leading companies were recalled from the direction of Liu-chia-kou.

Colonel Gromov,* who was known to be holding Ching-kou with a battalion and two guns. Major-General Kashtalinski at once despatched towards that place the mounted scouts of the 12th Regiment, who shortly afterwards reported that a Japanese column, instrength about a regiment of infantry, was moving from Ching-kou on Lao-fang-kou, and that a force of cavalry was also visible in the same direction. Major-General Kashtalinski now rode towards the latter place, and finding that the Japanese had occupied the heights in its vicinity, and that his left was seriously threatened, sent orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Linda, his chief staff officer, who was with the troops on the right bank of the Han-tu-ho-tzu, to retire at once to Tien-tzu. At this moment the 11th Company of the 22nd Regiment, which had been with Colonel Gromov's guns, happened to come up and was posted on some high ground facing north, whence it was ordered to delay the enemy's advance.

When Lieutenant-Colonel Linda received the order to retire to Tien-tzu, he moved his troops off in the following order; first the companies of the 12th Regiment which had been in reserve, next the machine gun company and the 2nd/6th Battery, escorted by the 8th Company of the 11th Regiment, then the remainder of the 12th Regiment, of which the 5th Company formed the rearguard. As soon as this movement was reported to General Kuroki, he issued orders that the whole Army was to advance and pursue.†

The road by which Major-General Kashtalinski's troops on the right bank of the Han-tu-ho-tzu stream must necessarily retire runs at first along a valley bounded by steep and rugged hills, difficult even for the movement of infantry. South-east of Ha-ma-tang, the defile narrows for about 1,000 yards, and on the south side of the road is a rocky ridge about one hundred and fifty feet above it, while on the north side the hills fall in steep slopes to the Han-tu-ho-tzu stream. Through this defile, on their

way from Ha-ma-tang, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 11th Regiment had already passed before they received Major-General Kashtalinski's order to occupy the heights marked 570'; but as soon as the order was received they turned to the north, and after a stiff climb took up the required position. The 3rd/3rd Battery, which was following the infantry along the hollow road, was at the same time ordered to return by Ha-ma-tang to the Feng-huang-cheng road. The withdrawal of this battery was thought necessary as the ground over which it must eventually retire was difficult, and it was not intended that the rear-guard should hold its position for long.

* Colonel Gromov despatched a report at 12.15 p.m., in which he stated that he was retiring, but it was not received by Major-General Kashtalinski until about 4 p.m.

† One authority states that "the infantry advanced again between 10.30 a.m. and noon"; another, "at noon"; and a third, at 2 p.m. The general movement in pursuit would not seem to have taken place until about 2 p.m.

‡ See Map V.

A little after 2 p.m. as its eight wagons reached the northern mouth of the gorge, about 1,000 yards south-east of Ha-ma-tang, they came under fire from the 5th Company of the 24th Japanese Regiment which had outstripped the other units of the 12th Division and had reached the north-west slopes of the group of hills that overlook the road. The movement was continued at a trot, and the wagons made their way in safety to Tien-tzu; but the guns, which were following, soon lost several horses and, as it seemed impossible to retire under the enemy's fire, the commander decided to bring them into action in support of the 11th Regiment. The two battalions of that regiment were also engaged with the 5th Company of the 24th Japanese Regiment, which, though losing heavily and running short of ammunition, obstinately held its ground. But the II/4th and III/4th Guard Regiment and the I/30th Regiment were approaching the scene, and though the Russians endeavoured to shake off the small force that dangerously menaced their retreat, pressure in other directions forced them to take up the position shown on Map V. Their left held the point marked 11/3 and their line followed the hills to the point II/4 west of the road to Tu-cheng-tzu where their right flank rested.

The troops* under Major-General Kashtalinski, falling back from the position on the Han-tu-ho-tzu stream, were at this time approaching the defile, when they were fired upon by some infantry of the Japanese Guard. The machine gun company, without waiting for orders, took post on the southern slopes of the position to cover the entrance to the defile from that side. Major-General Kashtalinski now detached two companies from his column to help in keeping the enemy in check, and these were followed shortly afterwards by three more companies. By their obstinate efforts the column gained the defile and was debouching from the northern end when the 12th Regiment came under long range fire from the north-east of Ha-ma-tang. The scouts advanced towards the enemy, and covered by their fire the regiment was able to continue its march to the Feng-huang-cheng road. The 2nd/6th Battery, which was following the infantry, on passing the south-eastern slopes of height 570' where part of the 3rd/3rd Battery was already in position, found itself exposed to a heavy rifle fire from the north and halted under cover of a slope. Lieutenant-Colonel Linda coming up, recognized the impossibility of continuing the movement by the road and decided to withdraw it by a circuitous route leaving height 570' in a southerly direction. The battery now moved off, but after covering about two thousand yards found the ground too steep for further movement, and returned to join the 3rd/3rd Battery.

In the meantime the circle round the Russian rear-guard had gradually been growing smaller. At 3 p.m. Major-General Watanabe, commanding the 2nd Guard Brigade, arrived with the I/4th Guard Regiment and took command of the Japanese

* Viz.—The 12th Regiment, 8th Company, 11th Regiment, the 2nd/6th Battery and 8 machine guns. The 2nd/6th Battery at this time had only 7 guns.

forces present at that part of the field. Shortly before 4 p.m., he ordered the 30th Regiment to attack in front, while the 10th Company of the 4th Guard Regiment was directed to turn the Russian right. This turning movement was successful, and the Russians on that flank retired across the narrow valley and climbed up the long, bare, razor-backed hill to the point 500'. North-east of the Ha-ma-tang—Chiu-lien-cheng road the Russians still held their main position, but the 10th and 12th Companies of the 4th Guard Regiment, from the southern extremity of the razor-backed hill, now took them in reverse, and by their fire, combined with that from the frontal attack, forced the Russians to retire into the valley. The 30th Regiment and the 3rd Guard Regiment hastened to establish themselves upon the ridge, and other companies coming up, the hills surrounding the Russians were occupied at 4.40 p.m.

At this juncture the 24th Regiment with some infantry and guns of the 12th Division came to the support of the gallant 5th Company which still barred the road to Ha-ma-tang. This company had lost nearly two-thirds of its numbers, and the remnant was on the point of being charged with the bayonet by some three hundred Russians. But the arrival of superior numbers averted the threatened danger, and the Russians were driven back into the valley with heavy loss.

The situation of the Russian rear-guard, whose firm defence had allowed the troops from An-tung to retire in safety, was now desperate. Nevertheless a few of the infantry still held the razor-backed hill, and others resisted from the lower slopes of the high ground north of the Ha-ma-tang road, while the guns, which had fallen back into the valley, fired in all directions. Gradually their fire slackened and then ceased,* for the Japanese infantry were masters of the situation and everything in the valley was at their mercy. The Russian infantry, however, showed no signs of yielding, and while some tried vainly to escape over the spur south of Ha-ma-tang, others strove to dig cover in the valley with their spades. At 5.10 p.m. Major-General Watanabe decided to terminate the fight and, with that object, ordered the 10th Company of the 4th Guard Regiment to attack the enemy with the bayonet. As this company was on the point of charging, the Russians, recognizing their inability to prolong the hopeless struggle, waved white handkerchiefs and in two or three minutes all firing ceased.

Their main body, covered by the 10th Regiment and the two guns of the 3rd/6th Battery from Ching-kou, was meantime falling back towards Feng-huang-cheng after being joined at Tien-tzu by the wagons of the 3rd/3rd Battery and portions of the 11th, 12th and 22nd Regiments. Soon after nightfall, Tang-shan-cheng, a post on the line of communication, was reached; and at 4.30 a.m., on the 2nd May, the retreat was resumed, the force concentrating during the day at Feng-huang-cheng. South of that place, some

* The 3rd/3rd Battery, having become separated from its wagons, had only the limber ammunition.

eleven miles, a rearguard, consisting of the 9th and 10th Regiments and the batteries, was left in position at Pien-men, but the Japanese made no attempt to follow up their victory beyond sending cavalry patrols along the roads leading north from the Ya-lu.

The losses in officers and men suffered by the Russians* in the battle of the 1st of May, are not accurately known, but some 1,400 dead were buried by the Japanese, and about 600 prisoners, many of whom were wounded, were taken. In addition to these, some wounded were carried from the field by the Russians, whose total casualties probably amounted to not less than 3,000 of all ranks, or about three times those of the Japanese. Of the 24 guns of the three Russian batteries which were engaged, 21 fell into the hands of the Japanese, while 8 machine guns, and 89 ammunition and other wagons, were included among the spoils of war.

* For losses of the Japanese and Russians, see Appendix C.



APPENDIX A.

STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN TROOPS IN THE FAR EAST,
i.e., EAST OF LAKE BAIKAL, AT THE BEGINNING
 OF FEBRUARY, 1904.

The figures given in the column "strength" are in accordance with the Russian war establishments, which (in the case of units of the active army stationed in the Far East) do not greatly exceed the peace strength. It is known, however, that the actual strength of units was often considerably below the authorized establishment.

A.—*Field Troops.*

Infantry.	Battalions.	Combatant Strength.
1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th East Siberian Rifle Brigades	32	30,992
5th and 6th East Siberian Rifle Brigades	16	15,496
7th* East Siberian Rifle Brigade... ..	12	11,540
8th* East Siberian Rifle Brigade... ..	8	7,748
2nd Brigad† 31st Infantry Division (Xth Army Corps)	8	7,748
2nd Brigad† 35th Infantry Division (XVIIth Army Corps)	8	7,748
9th‡ East Siberian Rifle Brigade... ..	8	7,748
1st§ Siberian Reserve Infantry Brigade... ..	4	3,032
Total Infantry	96	92,052

* The 7th and 8th East Siberian Rifle Brigades had been recently formed from the fortress infantry regiments of Port Arthur and Vladivostok respectively. These brigades were not classified as field troops, in the same sense as the remainder, but were allotted to the fortified *rayons* of Kuang-tung and Vladivostok. They were intended for the mobile defence of the fortresses of Port Arthur and Vladivostok, but were not to form part of the field armies.

† These brigades, with part of the corresponding artillery brigades, were moved to the Far East during the latter half of 1903.

‡ The formation of the 9th East Siberian Brigade was carried out, by means of drafts from European Russia, during the mobilization. The formation of the four regiments composing this brigade was not completed before the 18th February.

§ This brigade on mobilization would expand into a division of 20 battalions, having a combatant strength of 19,160 men. In view of the large number of reservists required to complete the war establishment, it is probable that this brigade did not complete its mobilization and expansion until considerably later. This view is confirmed by the fact that the

division formed by this brigade was at Harbin at the end of April, and only reached Mukden in May, notwithstanding the urgent need of troops at the front. For the purposes of the above table, therefore, the peace strength of this brigade has been adhered to.

Cavalry.	Squadrons.	Combatant Strength.
Primorsk Dragoon Regiment	6	919
1st Nerchinsk Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment ..	6	889
1st Chita Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment ...	6	889
1st Argun Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment ...	6	889
1st Verkhne-Udinsk Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment	6	889
Amur Cossack Division	3	443
Ussuri Cossack Division*	2	167
Total Cavalry	35	5,085

* These squadrons expanded on mobilization and formed six squadrons, with a combatant strength of 888 men. It is not known to what extent this large expansion was completed in the early days of February. The normal peace strength, therefore, has been taken for the purposes of this table.

Artillery.	Batteries.	Combatant Strength.	Guns.
1st East Siberian Artillery Brigade ...	8	2,122	64
2nd East Siberian Artillery Brigade ...	4	984	32
Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery ...	2	476	12
East Siberian Rifle Artillery Division ...	3	783	24
Trans-Baikal Artillery Division ...	2	522	16
31st Artillery Brigade	3	783	24
35th Artillery Brigade	3	783	24
Total Artillery	25	6,453	196

Engineers.	Companies.	Combatant Strength.
1st and 2nd East Siberian Sapper Battalions ...	8	1,612
3rd East Siberian Sapper Battalion*	4	806
Kuan-tung Sapper Company	1	279
Total Engineers	13	2,697

* Formed on 14th February.

Summary of Field Troops.				Combatant Strength.	
Infantry.— 96 Battalions	92,052 bayonets, with 8 machine guns.	
Cavalry.— 35 Squadrons	5,085 sabres.	
Artillery.— 25 Batteries	6,453 men with 196 guns.	
Engineers.— 13 Companies	2,697	
Total Field Troops	106,287 men with 196 guns.	

B.—*Fortress Troops.*

Infantry.				Battalion.	Combatant Strength.
Nikolaievsk Fortress Infantry Battalion				...	1,150
Artillery.				Companies.	Combatant Strength.
Port Arthur Fortress Artillery Regt.				...	2,620
Vladivostok Fortress Artillery Regt.				...	2,620
Nikolaievsk Fortress Artillery Company				...	392
Possiet Fortress Artillery Detachment				...	327
Total Fortress Artillery	5,959
Engineers.				Companies.	Combatant Strength.
Vladivostok Fortress Sapper Company				...	236
Vladivostok Submarine Mining Company				...	165
Nikolaievsk Submarine Mining Company				...	88
Novokievskoe (Possiet Bay) Submarine Mining Company				...	88
Total Fortress Engineers				...	577
Total Fortress Troops	7,686

C.—*Railway Troops.*

				Companies.	Combatant Strength.
Ussuri Railway Brigade—1st and 2nd Ussuri Railway Battalions				...	Men.
Trans-Amur Railway Brigade—4 Battalions				...	3,655
Total Railway Troops				...	7,776
				...	11 431

D.—“*Frontier*” *Guards*.*

On the line of communication, guarding the railway.	Combatant Strength.
Infantry.—55 Companies	13,750 Men.
Cavalry.— 55 Squadrons	8,250 ”
Artillery.— 6 Batteries	1,440 ” with 48 guns.
Total Frontier Guards	23,440 ” with 48 guns.

* It was reported that these troops were being increased, shortly before the outbreak of the war, to the extent of some 10,000 men. In the absence of definite information, however, this force is shown at its normal strength.

The troops enumerated above in detail may be summarized as follows :—

—	Combatant Strength.	Guns.
A.—Field troops	106,287	196
B.—Fortress troops	7,686	?
C.—Railway troops	11,431	—
D.—Frontier Guards	23,440	48
Approximate combatant strength of the Russian troops present, or in process of forma- tion, east of Lake Baikal at the beginning of February, 1904. }	148,844*	244 horse, field and mountain guns. + 8 machine guns.

* This number includes 13,852 Artillery men, and 3,272 Sappers.

The above force would be accompanied by some 16,000 to 17,000 non-combatants, forming an integral part of the troops, who, though not increasing the fighting strength, must be included in the ration strength of the army.

The fact that these figures are arrived at from the established strength of units, the only definite basis so far available, must not be lost sight of. There is reason to believe that the actual strength was far from being that of the establishments. Many authorities agree that the average fighting strength of a battalion did not exceed some 700 rifles, and that of a squadron some 100 sabres.

APPENDIX B.

THE COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FORCES
AVAILABLE FOR OPERATIONS IN MANCHURIA, AT THE END OF
APRIL, 1904.

Though nominally organized as three* Siberian Army Corps the troops were grouped without reference to such Army Corps organization, approximately as follows:—

Locality.	Troops.	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.	Guns.	Remarks.
1. At Liao-yang and echeloned along the railway between that place and Newchwang (under the immediate command of General Kuro-patkin).	1st E. Sibn. Rifle Div. ...	12	—	4	32	Belonging to 1st Sibn. Army Corps.
	<i>Machine Gun Company</i> ...	—	—	—	8	<i>Machine guns.</i>
	5th E. Sibn. Rifle Div. ...	12	—	4	32	Belonging to IIInd Sibn. Army Corps.
	<i>Machine Gun Company</i> ...	—	—	—	8	<i>Machine guns.</i>
	2nd Brigade 31st Infantry Division	8	—	3	24	Belonging to Xth Army Corps.
	2nd Brigade 35th Infantry Division	8	—	3	24	Belonging to XVIIth Army Corps.
	Trans-Baikal Cossack Division:—	—	—	—	—	
	2nd Verkhne - Udinsk Cossack Regiment.	—	6	—	—	Commanded by Maj-Gen. Rennenkampf. One authority states that the 2nd, 5th, and 6th Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Batteries as well as two E. Sibn. howitzer batteries were also present at Liao-yang.
	2nd Chita Cossack Reg. ...	—	6	—	—	
	2nd Nerchinsk Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—	
	2nd Argun Cossack Reg. ...	—	6	—	—	
	3rd and 4th Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Batteries.	—	—	2	12	
	3rd Verkhne - Udinsk Cossack Regiment.	—	6	—	—	Unbrigaded. 9 coys. engineers of which 1 coy. was present with the "Eastern Force," at the battle of the Ya-lu.
	Amur Cossack Regiment.	—	6	—	—	
	Half of 1st East Siberian Sapper Battalion.	—	—	—	—	
	2nd E. Sibn. Sapper Batt.	—	—	—	—	
	E. Sibn. Pontoon Batt. ...	—	—	—	—	
	E. Sibn. Balloon Coy. ...	—	—	—	—	
2. Near Newchwang (under Major - Gen. Kondratovich).	9th E. Sibn. Rifle Div. ...	12	—	4	32	
	Primorsk Dragoon Reg. ...	—	6	—	—	
3. On the railway, en route for Liao-yang.	1st Sibn. Infantry Div. ...	16	—	6	48	This division, composed of "reserve" troops, was at Harbin. By the beginning of May it had arrived at Mukden. The guns were of old pattern. It is possible that 4 batteries only were present with this division.

* A fourth Siberian Army Corps was composed of troops which had not yet reached the theatre of operations, and is therefore not referred to in this table.

Locality.	Troops.	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.	Guns.	Remarks.
4. On the Ya-lu, and S.E. coast of Manchuria (often referred to as the <i>East-corn Force</i> , under Lieut.-Gen. Zasu-lich).	3rd E. Sibn. Rifle Div. ...	12	—	4	32	Belonging to IIIrd Sibn. Army Corps.
	<i>Machine Gun Company</i> ...	—	—	—	8	<i>Machine guns.</i>
	6th E. Sibn. Rifle Div. ...	12	—	4	32	Belonging to IIud Sibn. Army Corps.
	1st E. Sibn. Mountain Batt.	—	—	1	8	
	Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade:—	—	—	—	—	
	1st Verkhne - Urdinsk Cossack Regiment.	—	6	—	—	Under Major-General Mishchenko. One squadron at least was detached in the Kuantung Peninsula.
	1st Chita Cossack Reg. ...	—	6	—	—	
	1st Argun Cossack Reg. ...	—	6	—	—	
5. At Port Arthur and in the Kuantung Peninsula (under Lieut.-Gen. Stessel)	Ussuri Cossack Reg. ...	—	6	—	—	
	1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Battery,	—	—	1	6	
	4th E. Sibn. Rifle Div. ...	12	—	4	32	Belonging to IIIrd Sibn. Army Corps.
	7th E. Sibn. Rifle Div. ...	12	—	3	24	Formed from "fortress" infantry, and remained at Port Arthur.
6. At Vladivostok and in the South Ussuri District (under Lieut.-General Linevich).	5th E. Sibn. Rifle Regt. ...	3	—	—	—	Detached from 2nd East Siberian Rifle Division at Vladivostok. 4 coys. engineers.
	3rd E. Sibn. Sapper Batt. ...	—	—	—	—	
	2nd E. Sibn. Rifle Div. ...	9	—	4	32	Belonging to Ist Siberian Army Corps; less one regiment detached to the Kuantung Peninsula.
	8th E. Sibn. Rifle Div. ...	12	—	3	24	Formed from "fortress" infantry, and remained at Vladivostok.
	2nd E. Sibn. Mn. Battery... Ussuri Cavalry Brigade:—	—	—	1	8	
	1st Nerchinsk Cossack Regiment.	—	6	—	—	
	Amur Cossack Div. ...	—	3	—	—	
	Half of 1st E. Sibn. Sapper battalion.	—	—	—	—	2 coys. engineers.
Totals ...		140	75	51*	402	

* i.e., 3 horse batteries = 18 guns, 46 field batteries = 368 guns, 2 mountain batteries = 16 guns.

NOTES.

(a) The troops enumerated above are "field troops" only, and were available for operations in the field. Fortress and technical troops as well as "Frontier Guards" are not included in this table, but are indicated in detail in Appendix A.

(b) The expansion of the East Siberian rifle brigades (of 8 battalions each) into divisions (of 12 battalions each), by increasing the establishment of each regiment by one battalion, was carried out simultaneously with the mobilization. The men required for this expansion were sent as drafts from units in European Russia. By the end of April, most, if not all, of the newly formed third battalions are believed to have joined their regiments.

Each of the newly formed East Siberian rifle divisions (with the exception of the 7th and 8th Divisions) had an artillery brigade of 4 field batteries, formed in a similar manner by drafts from European Russia.

(c) The combatant strength of the six principal groups indicated in the table, according to the establishments of the various units included in them, was as follows :--

Group.	Rifles.	Sabres.	Engineers.	Artillery.
1	38,576	5,334	2,192	3,962
2	11,540	919	—	960
3	15,496	—	—	1,566
4	23,080	3,556	—	2,440
5	25,965	—	1,014	1,680
6	20,195	1,332	507	1,962
Totals ...	134,852	11,141	3,713	12,570

A total combatant strength, all arms, of about 162,000 men. All authorities agree, however, that units were considerably below their established war strength. The large numbers of men employed extra-regimentally, and absent from the ranks of their units, is a characteristic feature, frequently noticed by Russian and other authorities. It appears that at this period of the campaign, the average fighting strength of a battalion rarely exceeded some 700 rifles, while that of a squadron may be taken as 120 sabres. Calculated on this basis, the actual fighting strength of the Russian forces enumerated would be, approximately, 98,000 rifles, 9,000 sabres, and 3,500 engineers, with some 402 guns, and 24 machine guns.

(d) Authorities differ considerably as to the number of batteries and guns. If the total arrived at in the table be reduced by 2 batteries (as noted opposite the 1st Siberian Infantry Division in the table on p. 5A) the total number of batteries and guns would be 49 batteries only with 386 guns. On the other hand, one authority places 3 horse batteries and 2 howitzer batteries at Liao-yang, which are not included in the table. If these units be added the total number of batteries would be 56, with 432 guns and howitzers.

The actual number cannot be stated with certainty.

APPENDIX C.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE FIRST JAPANESE ARMY ON THE 1ST MAY, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : General Baron Kuroki.

Chief of the Staff : Major-General Fuji.

Commander of Artillery : Colonel Matsumoto.

Commander of Engineers : Major-General T. Kodama.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
GUARD DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant - General Baron Hashegawa.				
1st Guard Brigade, Major-General N. Asada.				
1st Guard Regiment	3	—	—	—
2nd Guard Regiment....	3	—	—	—
2nd Guard Brigade, Major-General A. Watanabe.				
3rd Guard Regiment	3	—	—	—
4th Guard Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
Guard Cavalry Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
Guard Artillery Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
Guard Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	3

ORDER OF BATTLE.—*Continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
2ND DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Nishi.				
3rd Brigade, Major-General M. Matsunaga.				
4th Regiment	3	—	—	—
29th Regiment	3	—	—	—
15th Brigade, Major-General S. Okazaki.				
16th Regiment	3	—	—	—
30th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
2nd Cavalry Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
2nd Artillery Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
2nd Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	3
12TH DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Inouye.				
12th Brigade, Major-General N. Sasaki.				
14th Regiment	3	—	—	—
47th Regiment	3	—	—	—
23rd Brigade, Major-General Kigoshi.				
24th Regiment....	3	—	—	—
46th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
12th Cavalry Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
12th Artillery Regiment (mountain guns)	—	—	36	—

ORDER OF BATTLE.—*Continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
ENGINEERS.				
12th Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	3
CORPS ARTILLERY.				
5 Howitzer batteries (4.72-in. Krupp)	—	—	20	—
Total	36	9	128	9

Total combatant strength, all ranks 40,866, of which 33,462 were infantry.

Note.—It is believed that no *Kobi* brigades were present at the battle of the Ya-lu. During the campaign in Manchuria the 2nd and 12th Divisions had no *Kobi* brigades. The strength given above is that of war establishments, and no deduction has been made for sick or casualties prior to the battle.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE RUSSIAN EASTERN FORCE ON THE 1ST MAY, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : Lieutenant-General Zasulich (commanding 2nd Siberian Army Corps).

Chief of the Staff : Colonel Oranovski.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
3RD EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Kashtalinski.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Mardanov.				
9th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—
10th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Stolitsa.				
11th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—
12th East Siberian Rifle Regiment....	3	—	—	—
Machine Gun Company, attached to 9th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.	—	—	8	—
ARTILLERY.				
3rd East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, Colonel Shverin.				
1st, 2nd and 3rd Batteries	—	—	24	—
6TH EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Trusov.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Yatsinin.				
21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—
22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Krichinski.				
23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment....	3	—	—	—
24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment....	3	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
6th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, Colonel Meister.				
1st, 2nd and 3rd Batteries	—	—	24	—

ORDER OF BATTLE.—*Continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
ENGINEERS.				
2nd Company, 2nd East Siberian Sapper Battalion	—	—	—	1
CAVALRY.				
Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade, Major-General Mishchenko.				
1st Verkhne-Udinsk Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	1
1st Chita Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	1
<i>Attached.</i>				
1st Argun Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
Ussuri Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Battery	—	—	6	—
1st East Siberian Mountain Battery	—	—	8	—
Total	24	24	62	1

The total combatant strength of this force amounted to about 21,000 men, of which the infantry was nearly 17,000.

Note.—All of the above force was not present on the Ya-lu on the 1st May, 1904.

2½ battalions of the 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment were at Ta-ku-shan.

The 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment left Liao-yang for the Ya-lu on the 30th April.

Five companies of the 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment and one company of the 10th East Siberian Rifle Regiment were on the line of communication.

The greater portion of the cavalry was engaged in watching the coast from the mouth of the Ya-lu westward, and with it were a horse battery and a battery of either field or mountain guns.

There appears to have been a mountain battery with the Russian troops at Chang-tien-cheng (see foot of p. 54). This battery may have been the 1st East Siberian Mountain Battery, transferred from Major-General Mishchenko's force and replaced by the 1st/6th Battery, or it may have been an additional unit, as, at the time of the battle of the Ya-lu, there were two Russian mountain batteries in Manchuria.

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF THE YA-LU.

Japanese.

The following statement is from Japanese sources, and includes losses from the 26th April to 1st May.

Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total Losses.		
Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Grand Total.
5	198	33	775	—	10	38	983	1,021

An Austrian authority gives the losses by divisions as shown in the table below. It will be noticed that there is a discrepancy of 49 between the two statements.

Body of Troops.	Killed.		Wounded.		Total losses.		
	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Grand Total.
Guard Division ...	1	25	7	146	8	171	179
2nd "	1	90	14	352	15	442	457
12th "	3	48	8	375	11	423	434
	5	163	29	873	34	1,036	1,070

Russian.


The statement given below is a compilation from two Russian tables of losses, and is greatly at variance with the computation of the Japanese, who assert that up to the 7th May they buried 1,363 Russian dead. The Japanese estimate agrees more nearly with a less detailed Russian report, which gives the losses as 1,400 killed, 1,100 wounded, and 600 missing.

Body of Troops.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total Losses.		Grand Total.
	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	
Staff	1	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	2
9th Regiment ...	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
10th " ...	—	3	—	9	—	—	—	12	12
11th " ...	14	209	15	392	—	281	29	882	911
12th " ...	11	277	10	434	2	212	23	923	946
22nd " ...	—	23	4	152	—	144	4	319	323
Artillery Staff ...	—	—	2	—	—	—	2	—	2
2nd/6th Battery ...	2	32	1	39	—	27	3	98	101
3rd/6th " ...	—	8	1	17	—	15	1	40	41
3rd/3rd " ...	3	24	2	58	—	—	5	82	87
Machine Gun Co. ...	1	16	1	38	—	—	2	54	56
2nd/2nd Sapper Co.	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	1	2
	33	592	38	1,140	2	679	73	2,411	2,484

The 3rd/3rd Battery had 84 per cent. of its horses disabled and an almost similar loss befell the 2nd/6th Battery.

The Machine-Gun Company had twenty-two out of twenty-four horses disabled.

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